THE "DUTY" TO BE A RATIONAL SHAREHOLDER
David A. Hoffman†
"[I]n evaluating disclosure, as we must here, we continue to assume rationality
and that all participants approach the situation thinking as Economic Man, within
Adam Smith's definition, seeking to follow the lead of Smith's ‘Invisible Hand.’"
Chock Full O’Nuts Corp. v. Finkelstein, 548 F. Supp. 212, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(Brieant, J.)

American public shareholders are uniquely blessed by the freedom to do what
they will with their capital. Unlike other stakeholders, shareholders owe the corporation
no legal duties.1 Shareholders provide cash, and, in exchange, receive management’s
fiduciary fealty and limited voting and distribution rights.2 This framework respects the
difficulties that shareholders face in contracting to protect their rights, and is
conventionally summarized by a simple moral: "The only promise that makes sense in
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1
See FLETCHER CYC CORP. § 5713 (Perm. Ed. 2000) ("Ordinarily, at least unless the shareholder is a
majority shareholder or active in the management of the corporation, he has no well-defined duties.")
(internal footnotes omitted); Paula J. Dalley, The Misguided Doctrine of Stockholder Fiduciary Duties, 33
HOF. L. REV. 175, 206-11 (2004) (discussing basic corporate law framework of shareholder rights and
duties); see also Chiarella v. United States, 446 U.S. 222, 229 (1980) (purchasers of stock owe no duties to
corporations or potential shareholders); cf. JAMES D. COX & THOMAS L. HAZEN, CORPORATIONS §
11.11(2nd Ed. 2003) (duties of majority shareholders); id. at § 10.1-10.19 (directors' and officers' duties of
care and loyalty).
There are two minor exceptions to the no duty rule, apart from the major one identified in this article.
First, shareholders wishing to file derivative actions have a duty first to make a demand on the board. See
generally COX & HAZEN, supra, § 15.04.
Second, the statute of limitations may be seen as a duty to inquire about the underlying facts of a securities
claim. See, e.g., Newman v. Warnaco Group, Inc., 335 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2003).
2
See Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics to Show the Power and Efficiency of Corporate Law
as Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581, 623 (2002).

Duty To Be Rational
such an open-ended relation is [for management] to work hard and honestly."3 Indeed,
the absence of bilateral duties is the unstated assumption and organizing principle of
every discussion of corporate governance.4
Or so the story goes. In reality, courts require individual investors to investigate
their purchases, to coldly process risk, to disregard oral statements of optimism, and
generally to be economically rational investors. If investors fail to meet these
expectations, judges deny them the protection of the securities laws. In this way, courts
impose on public securities investors a special kind of legal duty, novel in scope and, I
will argue, ungrounded in principle.
Surprisingly, although the makings of this duty have been present for almost
thirty years, no study to date has considered the sheer scope of rationality’s burden:
courts require investors to act in ways that ordinary citizens do not, if they are to receive
a government benefit – protection from fraud – nominally available to all.5 Nor have
commentators addressed the demographic and redistributive consequences of judicially
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FRANK H. EASTERBROOK AND DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 91
(1991) (articulating the dominant economic view of corporate governance) (emphasis added).
4
We may know this to be true by conducting a thought experiment. Imagine that when you buy a share of
stock, the law imposed a duty of loyalty to the corporation and its shareholders. You proceed to hedge
your investment, choosing (foolishly) to short your own stock instead of a competitor's. The stock price
falls. You decide to liquidate both positions, making a modest profit. Would the corporation, or your
fellow shareholders, sue you for breach of the duty you owe them? Yes, as corporations would look like
partnerships; under such circumstances, your liability would be limited only by your fealty and assets.
5
Bainbridge and Gulati's recent work is the first, to my knowledge, that begins the task of a controlled
empirical investigation of the materiality doctrine. See Stephen M. Bainbridge and G. Mitu Gulati, How do
Judges Maximize? (The Same Way Everybody Else Does – Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud
Opinions, 51 EMORY L. J. 83, 116 n.94 (2002); cf. Donald C. Langevoort, Review Essay, Are Judges
Motivated to Create "Good" Securities Fraud Doctrine? 51 EMORY L. J.309 (2002) (commenting on
Bainbridge and Gulati's study). Unlike the present study, Bainbridge and Gulati do not analyze the rates at
which courts apply the various immateriality techniques in the caselaw, relying instead on a behavioral
explanation for why such techniques might be effective or attractive. Quantitative caselaw analysis of
disclosure outside of the securities fraud context is just beginning, but has already produced one
particularly interesting analysis of common law disclosure duties. See Kimberly D. Krawiec & Kathryn
Zeiler, Common Law Disclosure Duties and the Sin of Omission: Testing the Meta-theories, UNC Leg.
Stud. Research Paper No. 04-4, available at http:sssrn.com/abstract=614501 (analyzing 466 decisions, and
testing results against the conventional theories explaining when disclosure is required).
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privileging certain classes of investors, or the collateral effects of imposing new investor
duties on the mainstream of corporate law. This article takes up these topics.
To recover under securities laws, such as the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934,6
private plaintiffs, or the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")7 must prove by a
substantial likelihood that a suspect corporate disclosure omitted (or misrepresented)
material facts,8 i.e., facts that a "reasonable investor" would have considered significant.9
But who and what is a "reasonable investor"?10 In tort and contract law, "reasonableness"
has a subjective and an objective component: reasonable people act in ways that meet
societal expectations, while remaining true to a subjective understanding of legal duties
and rights.11 The securities law standard is similar,12 but courts choose an entirely
objective approach.13

6

See LOUIS LOSS AND JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION IV 2074-75 (3d ed.
2000) (materiality precedent interchangeable in federal securities laws).
7
See Yvonne Ching Ling Lee, The Elusive Concept of "Materiality" Under the U.S. Federal Securities
Laws, 40 WILL. L. REV. 661, 663 (2004) (application of standard by SEC). The SEC rewords the
traditional caselaw standard in its enforcement directions, to define a reasonable investor as one who
"generally focuses on matters that have affected, or will affect, a company's profitability and financial
ou
t look." Memorandum from David B.H. Martin, Director, Division of Corporation Finance, SEC, to
Laura Unger, Acting Chair, SEC, at 2 (May 8, 2001) (describing the longstanding SEC position).
8
See LOSS AND SELIGMAN, supra n. 6, at 2071.
9
TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); see also Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485
U.S. 224, 232 (1988) ("expressly adopt[ing] the TSC Industries standard of materiality for the 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 context").
10
As some have observed, both "reasonable" and "investor" have multiple variants: rational, prudent,
informed, lay and typical; shareholder, stockholder, businessman, man and person. Richard L. Epling and
Terence W. Thompson, Securities Disclosure in Bankruptcy, 39 BUS. LAW. 855, 891-93 (1984).
11
See ALLAN E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, §§ 7.9, 7.10 (4th Ed. Aspen Publishers, 2004); DAN B.
DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, §§ 117, 118 (West Group, 2000); see also Piambino v. Bailey, 610 F.2d
1306, 1320 (5th Cir. 1980) (analogizing reasonable investor to reasonable person standard in tort cases).
12
Basic, 485 U.S. at 232. The "elusiveness" of the materiality standard creates an enormous degree of
frustration among practitioners, and some academics. See Lee, supra n. 7, at 675-76; Joan MacLeon
Heminway, Materiality Guidance in the Context of Insider Trading: A Call for Action, 2003 AM. U. L.
REV. 1131, 1148-1168 (analogizing materiality standard to the Hogwort's sorting hat, and arguing that
ambiguity in the standard creates problems for lawyers and clients in evaluating risk and benefits of
disclosure).
13
See generally Epling and Thompson, supra n. 10, at 894-5; Lee, supra n. 7, at 664. There are alternative
stories. For example, Bainbridge and Gulati describe the emergence of presumed immateriality doctrine as
a method for judges to quickly and easily deal with constraints on their time and resources. See Bainbridge
and Gulati, supra n. 5, at 113-131; cf. Langevoort, supra n. 5, at 316-18 (concluding that a rapid embrace
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Adjudicating securities cases under the "reasonable investor" standard, courts
soon confronted a dissonance between what forces they believed wouldmove m arkets
(i.e., disclosure of information affecting a firm’s finances) and the relatively trivial
disclosures that plaintiffs had claimed created market effects.14 To resolve this tension,
courts developed the doctrine of immateriality as a matter of law.15 Applying this
doctrine, courts began to dismiss plaintiffs’ allegations thata corporation had made false
or misleading disclosures because judges presumed a reasonable shareholder would have
ignored the fraud. Immateriality as a matter of law is thus best seen as "presumed
immateriality." It is the scope and nature of presumed immateriality that creates the duty
to be a rational shareholder.
Conventional wisdom holds that courts rarely make findings of presumed
immateriality. Courts say they are applying a standard that is self-consciously limited:
the materiality judgment "requires delicate assessments of the inferences a reasonable
shareholder would draw . . . and these assessments are peculiarly ones for the trier of
fact."16 Similarly, scholars, although applauding the courts’ applications of presumptive
immateriality,17 conclude that materiality issues in securities cases are almost always left

of the anti-rationality defenses represents "a shift in the ideology of the judiciary leading to a pro-defendant
bias.") I comment on these stories infra at Part IV.
14
Courts have rejected a truly objective, quantitative test, which would make market reaction necessary and
sufficient to find materiality. See Lee, supra n. 7, at 664; but cf. Elkind v. Liggest & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d
156, 166 (2d Cir. 1980) (discussing market reaction as relevant to materiality determination).
15
See LOSS & SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS, supra n. 6, at 2082-2105. Similarly, some disclosed
information is presumptively material. See Note, Should the SEC Expand Nonfinancial Disclosure
Requirements?, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1433 (2002) (fact of business operations in a foreign company under
government sanction likely to be treated as material per se).
16
TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 450. The Court elsewhere rejected a less stringent standard, stating that
materiality was not merely something a "reasonable shareholder might consider important. Id. at 446.
17
See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Nowicki, A Response to Professor John Coffee: Analyst Liability Under Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1305, 1325 (2004) (noting with approval
a Second Circuit case upholding a finding of presumed immateriality so as to prevent disclosure of an
"avalanche of trivial information.")
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for jury resolution.18 Only very recently have some academics begun to question this
conventional account.19
In this paper, I demonstrate empirically that courts dismiss claims by presuming
immateriality in half of opinions considering materiality.20 This is a surprising, and
significant, finding. Presumed immateriality’s magnitude means that the doctrine
channels a large set of claims and plaintiffs out of the securities fraud system; the
mechanism of this channeling is a judicially created set of commitments and assumptions
regarding how reasonable investors act. That is, presumed immateriality reflects a kind
of judicial ideology concerning which investors are entitled to protection from securities
fraud and which are not.
To understand this ideological choice, my empirical analysis turned to presumed
immateriality’s rationales. This paper shows that courts implicitly (and, as in Chock Full
O’Nuts, sometimes explicitly) treat economic rationality as a synonym for

18

See, e.g., Paul Vizcarrondo et al., Liability Under Sections 11, 12, 15 and 17 of the Securities Act of 1933
and Sections 10, 18 and 20 of the Securities Act of 1934, 1443 PLI/CORP 1049, 1060 (2004) ("[Q]uestions
of materiality are usually for the jury to decide . . ."); Epling and Thompson, supra n. 10, at 895
("Accordingly, the inference of such an investor's actions is the responsibility of the trier of fact and
normally is not susceptible to resolution on summary judgment."); Heminway, supra n. 12, at 1183 (linking
the "ill-defined standard" to difficulty in resolving cases pre-trial); Terry Fleming, Perspectives on Business
Law: Telling the Truth Slant – Defending Insider Trading Claims Against Legal and Financial Professions,
28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1421, 1430 (2002) ("Motions for judgment on the pleadings and summary
judgment are rarely granted"); Edward A. Fallone, Section 10(b) and the Vagaries of Federal Common
Law: The Merits of Codifying the Private Cause of Action Under a Structuralist Approach, 1997 U. ILL. L.
REV. 71, 100; Robert A. Rosenfeld and Clyde J. Wadsowrth, Materiality After Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 378
PLI/LIT 275, 290 (1989) (questioning viability of summary judgment on materiality issues following
Basic).
19
Bainbridge and Gulati, analyzing a set of 100 randomly selected securities cases, note briefly that 91
were decided at the motion to dismiss stage, and over 70 percent of those involved materiality
determinations in favor of defendants. See Bainbridge and Gulati, supra n. 5, at 116, n.94; cf. COX AND
HAZEN, supra n. 1, at 296 (presumed immateriality determinations arise "with some regularity"); Donald C.
Langevoort, Seeking Sunlight in Santa Fe's Shadow: the SEC's Pursuit of Managerial Accountability, 79
WASH. U. L.Q. 449, 479-80 (2001) (noting the "stunning willingness of judges to decide difficult
materiality issues 'as a matter of law'").
20
This finding applies to private plaintiff suits only. Overall, the blended rate is slightly less than 50%.
See infra Part II.
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reasonableness, and irrationality as a synonym for unreasonableness.21 This ideological
decision fundamentally misconceives how shareholders actually respond to information.
Shareholders’ behavior deviates from economic rationality in both predictable and
unpredictable ways; individuals "suffer" from a variety of cognitive biases, heuristics,
and social norms. In law, these deviations from rational expectations have been
described by a growing literature adapted from behavioral economics.22 Part I of this
article reviews recent behavioralism literature, with a special focus on the experimental
results with which behavioralists have undermined traditional assumptions of shareholder
rationality.
Part II analyzes 471 federal securities cases from the Second Circuit and its
district courts to demonstrate those courts’ willingness to require shareholders to act like
economically rational actors, a fictional legal construct. As a part of my analysis, I ask
three crucial questions: (1) what is the scope of the "presumed immateriality" doctrine?;
(2) how has it changed over time?; (3) does party identity matter in determining if a
disclosure is immaterial as a matter of law? These questions are significant to

21

See infra Part III. Others have suggested that judges ought to correct for human irrationality through the
common law. For example, Choi and Pritchard describe a model of "intermediate scrutiny" for judges'
attempts to modulate investor irrationality through the common law. Stephen Choi and Adam Pritchard,
Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 47-50 (2003). Choi and Pritchard argue that
courts, unlike regulators, are subject to market-like constraints on their ability and have already created a
standard – materiality, that "reflect[s] the cognitive limitations facing investors." Id. at 48. However, Choi
and Pritchard caution that courts may face their own biases, may be temped to shunt cases from their
dockets by creating bright line rules, and may unthinkingly follow foolish precedent. Id. at 50.
22
The corpus of behavioral law and economics literature is vast and still spawning. Traditional accounts
situate its origin in the work of Robert Ellickson and Herbert Hovenkamp. See Robert C. Ellickson,
Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65
CHI-KENT L. REV. 23 (1989); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Limits of Preference-Based Legal Policy, 89 N.Y.
U. L. REV. 4, 76 (1994). A good place to begin looking at the scholarship is the anthology BEHAVIORAL
LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein, ed., 2000).
Recent work also includes an important piece about the malleability of decision making: Jon D. Hanson
and Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously (I): The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74
N.Y.U. L. REV. 630 (1999).
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understanding what courts are actually doing and why they are doing it, and mine is the
first study to consider the answers in a systematic way.23
Part III discusses how courts’ presumptions about reasonable investor behavior
(manifest in the reasons they give for findings of immateriality) are in tension with the
findings of social science research on human decision making (described in Part I). In
particular, I focus on how courts’ justifications for presumed immateriality have moved
from fact-intensive investigations to bright-line tests based on the language contained in
disclosures.
In Part IV, I build on my empirical analysis by describing how the presumed
immateriality doctrine creates a common-law "duty of rationality."24 I make predictions
about the market effects of the duty of rationality, which (if true) would suggest that the
application of the securities lawsmay have deep, and potentially unintended
redistributive and demographic effects: they may be driving individual investors to
mutual funds and redistributing wealth away from minorities and women towards white
men.25
23

In the last few years, there have been several important empirical investigations of securities fraud cases.
Mitu Gulati, Jeffrey J. Rachlinksi and Donald C. Langevoort, Fraud by Hindsight , 98 N.W. U. L. REV. 773,
803-804 (2004) (analyzing a database of cases discussing the "fraud by hindsight" doctrine); Bainbridge
and Gulati, supra n. 5, at 88, n.12 (analyzing 100 randomly selected cases from 1996 through 2001, and
reaching certain limited conclusions regarding plaintiff success rate in materiality analyses); Hillary A.
Sale, Judging Heuristics, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 903 (2002) (describing change in percentages of
complaints surviving dismissal post-PLSRA as arising from judicial heuristics); Theresa A. Gabaldon, A
Sense of Security: An Empirical Study, 25 J. CORP. L. 307 (2000) (analyzing courts' treatment of the term
"security"). This empirical work in part, confirms intuitions that some scholars had about the ways the
securities laws were being applied. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Half-Truths: Protecting Mistaken
Inferences by Investors and Others, 52 STAN. L. REV. 87, 90 n.16 (1999) (impressions of the effects of
procedure on securities law).
24
As far as I can tell, I am the first to suggest that this duty positively accounts for some securities fraud
doctrines. However, Donald Langevoort's commentary on prior empirical investigations questioned
whether judges were projecting their own ideal of how they would act as investors – "prone to selfattributions that overweight the level of caution and skepticism that they bring to their decisionmaking and
thus to their construal of reasonableness – to their decisions as adjudicators." See Langevoort, Are Judges
Motivated, supra n. 5, at 317-18.
25
See infra at text accompanying notes 261 through 270.
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At its heart, when its scope is appreciated, presumed immateriality begins to look
like a product of the courts’ struggle to control the behavior of two very different kinds of
participants in the system of securities regulation: investor-plaintiffs, and juries.
Presumed immateriality, because it assumes – contrary to real world evidence – that
investors act rationally, removes power from juries and transfers it to judges, while
imposing formidable cognitive burdens on investors seeking to be protected from fraud.
The entire construct (courts’ presumptions, the scope of immateriality, and a resulting
investor duty to be rational) seems in turn to be based on the courts’ need to harmonize
securities law with the foundational assumption of corporate law: that all parties to the
corporate form act rationally. It is to this assumption, and the evidence that undermines
it, that I now turn.
Part I:

Behavioral Analysis of Public Shareholders
Traditionally, hornbook law and academic literature described common

shareholders as rational actors,26 and the assumption remains implicit "in the minds of all
concerned with doing business under the corporate form."27 Rational shareholders are
"able to anticipate and consider all relevant factors in making choices and … they have
unlimited computational capacities."28
Rational shareholders know what they want and select it in the most efficient way
available.29 Rational shareholders do not speculate (unless the risk/benefit calculation

26

Patrick J. Ryan, Rule 14a-8, Institutional Shareholder Proposals, and Corporate Democracy, 23 GA. L.
REV. 97, 178 (1988); Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and its Consequences
for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 417, 418 (2003); Chock Full O'Nuts, 548 F. Supp. at 219.
27
Ryan, supra n. 26, at 178.
28
Paredes, supra n. 26, at 434.
29
See Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551,
1551 (1998) (analogizing rational persons to rats which "are at least as rational as human beings when
rationality is defined as achieving one's ends . . . at least cost"). Another way of describing the expected
utility theory is to note its four principal decisionmaking principles: ordering (people "must prefer one
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justifies speculation). They avoid market panics and calmly accept stock appreciation.30
They do not buy stocks based on internet rumors.31 Rational investors have one purpose
in choosing what to do with their investments: make more money.32
Because rational shareholders make such predictable and good decisions, the
rational shareholder model supports a powerful economically based critique of securities
regulation. Some legal economists believe that shareholders should be permitted to
accept contracts that opt out of the disclosure and fraud regime created by federal
securities laws – so-called "contractarians."33 Contractarians argue that investors should
be permitted to contract away their rights to protection against fraud, although courts
might protect particularly inexperienced investors.34 Contractarian theory has found a

[object to another] or be indifferent to both"); continuity ("if the odds are right, a person will always
gamble"); independence ("A person's preferences between two objects should remain unchanged when the
objects are substituted into identical lotteries"); and invariance (individuals should express the same
preferences when different descriptions of the same outcome are presented). See Hanson and Kysar, supra
n.22 , at 642.
30
Cf. ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (Princeton 2000) (arguing that individuals irrationally
participated in the late-1990s market bubble).
31
Robert Prentice, Contract-Based Defenses in Securities Fraud Litigation: A Behavioral Analysis, 2003
U. ILL. L. REV. 337, 369-71 (discussing case of a New Jersey teenager subject to a SEC enforcement action
because of his postings on internet chat-boards).
32
The most common thick version of the rational choice theory is wealth-maximization, which predicts that
individuals will act to maximize they amount of money they have. Russell B. Korobkin and Thomas S.
Ulen, Law and Behavioral Sciences: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88
CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1066 (2000).
33
Contractarianism also describes these scholars' view of the nature of corporate law generally. That is,
contractarians believe that all players in the market for corporate control (i.e. shareholders, managers,
directors, employees, etc.) should determine their mutual duties via contract law. See generally Stephen
Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88 CAL. L. REV. 279 (2002) (arguing
for deregulation of securities in favor of market based disclosure system); A. C. Pritchard, Markets as
Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L.
REV. 925 (1999) (proposing that exchanges self-regulate); Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator,
83 VA. L. REV. 14553 (1997); Larry E. Ribenstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud:
A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 U. IOWA J. CORP. L. 1, 47-61 (2002) (defending market
and contractual approaches after considering insights from BLE literature); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL,
supra n. 3; Prentice, supra n. 31, at 344-350 (discussing contractarian scholarship and caselaw).
34
Compare Choi, Regulating Investors, supra n. 33, at 284-326 with Robert A. Prentice, Whither Securities
Regulation?Some Behavioral Observations Regarding Proposals For Its Future, 51 Duke L.J. 1387,
1489-90 (2002) (criticizing Choi's proposal as unrealistic and based on flawed assumptions).
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fertile reception with some judges.35 For example, in Carr v. Cigna Securities, Inc.,
Judge Richard Posner denied the securities fraud claims of an unsophisticated investor
who had been told orally that certain investments were safe and conservative, but had
received written warnings detailing their high risk.36 Posner reasoned that written
warnings should, as a matter of law, preclude the possibility of recovery based on oral
falsehoods.37
Behavioral law and economics ("BLE") undermines the contractarian thesis by
using data from psychology experiments to radically alter our view of how humans make
choices.38 BLE documents how individuals’ choice-making behavior systematically
diverges from the predictions of the rational-actor model of human behavior.
A second component of BLE research aims to develop and defend a theory of
"bounded self interest."39 Bounded self-interest theory attempts to explain the
attractiveness of norms of fairness, sharing, reciprocity,and altruism in ways distinct
from those traditionally relied on by economists.

35

See Douglas M. Branson, Running the Gauntlet: A Description of the Arduous, and Now Often Fatal,
Journey for Plaintiffs in Federal Securities Law Actions, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 3, 23 (1996) ("[C]ontract
reigns uber alles…")
36
95 F.3d 544 (7th Cif. 1996).
37
Id. See also Prentice, supra n. 31, at 345-6.
38
See generally BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS supra n. 22 (collecting essays); Kent Greenfield and
Peter C. Kostant, An Experimental Test of Fairness Under Agency and Profit-Maximization Constraints
(With Notes on Implications For Corporate Governance), 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 983, 984-85 (2003)
(introducing experimental study aimed at undermining the traditional law and economic view of the value
of the profit-maximization norm); Jennifer Arlen et al., Endowment Effects Within Corporate Agency
Relationships, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2-5 (2002) (discussing effect on BLE on received wisdom of corporate
law scholarship); David A. Hoffman and Michael P. O'Shea, Can Law and Economics Be Both Practical
and Principled, 53 ALA. L. REV. 335, 360-63 (2002) (describing how behavioral literature undermined
classical law and economist normative research); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A
Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1058-59(2000) ("For corporate and securities law scholars,
behavioral economics probably is the most exciting intellectual development of the last decade."); cf. Lynn
A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance, 28 J. CORP. LAW
636 (2003) (discussion BLE implications for the efficient capital markets hypothesis).
39
See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, & Richard H. Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra n. 22, at 16.
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BLE is a controversial discipline thathas created an ever-expanding literature
debating its political40 and methodological roots.41 And, because I situate my scholarship
firmly within the BLE "camp," I am troubled by the perception that BLE research has
been manipulated to serve the ends of certain private entities.42

40

BLE has traditionally been seen as a politically "liberal" movement because it emboldens the use of
government intervention to solve legal policy choices. See Philip E. Tetlock & Barbara A. Mellers, The
Great Rationality Debate, 13 PSYCHOL. SCI. 94, 97 (2002) (economists "on the left" are more likely to
embrace BLE than economists "on the right"); Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure, supra n. 38, at 1027
("[I]t seems probable that behavioral economics increasingly will be invoked by those who favor
government intervention precisely because behavioral economics offers a new line of argument in favor of
regulating private conduct"); but cf. Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral
Economics and the Case for "Asymmetric Paternalism," 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211 (2003) (articulating a
theory of "asymmetric paternalism" which would protect irrational individuals while not harming rational
ones). That "paternalism" serves a progressive agenda is debatable.
41
Some argue that BLE experiments are flawed in design or execution. See, e.g., Tanina Rostain,
Educating Homo Economicus: Cautionary Notes on the New Behavioral Law and Economics Movement,
34 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 973 (2000) (discussing problems of laboratory research); Robert E. Scott, The Limits
of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1603 (2000) (describing problem of
generalizing from limited experimental data). The most prominent of these critics argues that some
experiments seemed designed to elicit nonrational responses, because of explicit or implicit cues to
experimental subjects:
Virtually all of the claims of the [BLE theorists are] . . . at most, linguistic hedges, such as the data
"suggest" some effect or some effect "generally" occurs, but not outright admissions that legal
decision theory is founded on generalizations that are shakily inferred from aggregated data in
between- subjects experiments.
Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New
Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907, 1977-84 (2002) (attacking methodology of
BLE).
Robert Prentice has responded that Mitchell's claim amounts to an argument "about details", as Mitchell
admits that the rational actor model does not "in any way approximate[] how people actually act." Robert
A. Prentice, Chicago Man, K-T Man, and the Future of Behavioral Law and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV.
1663, 1720 (2003) (defending BLE experiments against Mitchell's "withering attack").
42
See, e.g., Denise E. Antolini, Punitive Damages in Rhetoric and Reality: An Integrated Empirical
Analysis of Punitive Damages in Hawaii, 1985-2001, 20 J.L. & POL. 143, 151-53 (2004) (discussing Exxon
Corporation funding of jury experiments); Theodore Eisenberg, Damage Awards in Perspective: Behind
the Headline-Grabbing Awards in Exxon Valdez and Engle, 36 WAKE. FORR. L. REV.1129, 1147-49 (2002)
(discussing Exxon funding of anti-jury scholarship); Neil Vidmar, Juries Don't Make Legal Decisions! And
Other Problems: A Critique of Hastie et al. on Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 705, 713
(1999) (same); Richard Lempert, Juries, Hindsight, and Punitive Damage Awards: Failures of a Social
Science Case for Change, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 867, 871 n.16 (1999) ("[I]t appears that Exxon is making a
concerted effort to build a social science case for reducing or taking away the jury's discretion in awarding
punitive damages and that the Hastie and Viscusi study is a part of this effort. ... Indeed, Exxon has recently
cited the above research in its appeal of the $5.3 billion Exxon Valdez award."). For a theoretical account
of how Exxon's funding of BLE research might affect its conclusions, see Jon Hanson and David Yosifon,
The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep
Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 273-279 (2003) (discussing possible "deep capture" of legal academics
by corporate funding).
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But, even if private parties are using BLE to further their own ends, this does not
substantially imperil BLE’s core message. BLE is a critical empirical study driven by
observations of indeterminacy and manipulability of individual choices in reaction to
stimuli.43 Decision-makers act under the influence of several cognitive biases and
heuristics that distort their ability to rationally make decisions, each of which "pushes" in
a different direction. In the aggregate, it is difficult to predict what individuals will do.44
As significantly, individuals’ perceptions of risk (which, in the rational actor model exists
independently of the observer) turn out to be manipulable in practice, through the context
and framing of its presentation.45 On this understanding of BLE’s core message of
manipulability, I embrace BLE’s experimental data with an appropriate amount of
caution,46 which I hope the reader will share.47
In the last two to three years, scholars have endeavored to bring additional
coherence to BLE by creating models of brain activity that helpexplain BLE’s results.
These scholars, developing a new strand of scholarship called "neuroeconomics," attempt
43

See generally Hanson & Kysar, supra n. 22, at 722.
Id.
45
Id. at 724-743.
46
I am particularly dubious of generalizing claims about perceptions of risk or use of information, because
the central message of BLE (again) is the indeterminacy and manipulability of behavior. In parts of this
paper, I make sweeping generalizations. When I do so, I am aware that such claims are susceptible to
reversal if the question had been presented differently.
47
A separate critique relates to BLE's need for a unifying theory. See, e.g., Russell B. Korbkin and Thomas
S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Sciences: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88
CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1057. 1071-72 (2000) (the BLE movement "lacks a single, coherent theory of
behavior."). According to Korobkin and Ulen, the goal of BLE ought to be to allow scholars to predict
"with reasonable success" the responses of citizens to applicable legal rules. Id. at 1072. Thus, BLE need
not articulate a theoretical model to compete with the rational actor model, so long as its results are
realistic. Korobkin and Ulen, id., at 1058, 1071-73; Hanson & Kysar, supra n. 22, at 687-693 ("a complex
model with realistic predictive capabilities is far preferable to a simplified model that bears little
relationship to actual behavior.") Korobkin and Ulen analogize BLE's atheoretical core to the process of
incomplete theorization in common law adjudication, citing to Cass Sunstein's work on incompletely
theorized arguments. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 3561 (1996). Curiously, law and economics itself has often resorted to the contention that the best is the
enemy of the good. See, e.g., Hoffman & O'Shea, supra n. 38, at 344 (criticizing the "open-ended approach
to moral and practical questions" common in law and economics literature, and discussing application of
Sunstein's theory of incompleteness to legal movements).
44
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to divine organic causes to explain BLE’s experimental results.48 Scientists collect data
on how various stimulants effect brain activity by directly imaging the brain using MRIlike machines.49 Specifically, scientists watch how blood flows to different regions of the
brain when individuals are engaged in economic transactions, noting which parts of the
brain are engaged by different choice behaviors.50
To make sense of BLE’s application to the securities laws, the discussion below
divides into three parts, corresponding to the three categorical ways that BLE undermines
the contractarian thesis which still dominates academic discussion: Trouble With
Probability; Trouble With Informational Processing; and Social Investing. The purpose
of this organization (which I used to make sense of the bewildering array of social
science results) is not to suggest that individuals are necessarily subject to discrete and
self-contained biases that each distort "rationality," but rather to describe how BLE
systematically undermines rationality’s major premises. We begin with probability.
1.

Trouble with Probability

Individuals are exceptionally poor at evaluating risk and uncertainty. This is old
news– after all, the multi-billion dollar, enormously profitable gambling industry depends
on a certain amount of willful blindness to the reality of expected losses. But, our trouble
with risk goes beyond decisions to play against the house.51 Rather, as this section

48

See, e.g., Terrence Chorvat et al., Law and Neuroeconomics 45 (George Mason Univ. Sch. of Law, Law
& Econ. Research Paper No. 04-07, 2004), http//ssrn.com/abstract= 501063; RICHARD RESTAK, THE NEW
BRAIN 3 (2003); Colin F. Camerer, George F. Loewenstein, Drazen Prelec, Neuroeconomics: How
Neuroscience Can Inform Economics, J. ECON. LIT., (forthcoming) (manuscript at 1), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=590965; William J. Gehring & Adrian R. Willoughby,
The Medial Frontal Cortex and the Rapid Processing of Monetary Gains and Losses, 295 SCI. 2279, 227981 (2002).
49
See Chorvat et al., supra n.48, at 14-15.
50
Id. at 15.
51
Gambling may be thought of rational because it is "fun." But, presumably, whatever "fun" individuals
achieve while losing money in a casino because they misjudge the odds of winning in Craps is distinct from
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explores, our approaches to risks and rewards are bafflingly inconsistent, and often (in
the aggregate) self-defeating.
a.

Hindsight Bias

"Hindsight bias" is a dressed-up term for our belief in destiny: that which has
happened was likely to have happened all along.52 This bias follows from individuals’
consistent overstatements of "what they could have been predicted after events have
unfolded."53 Hindsight bias results from the (common sense) tendency of our brains to
incorporate new information into existing information automatically.54 Indeed, some
hypothesize that the brain prefers "simple inference strategies that require little
information" to complicated strategies that hinge on a lot of information.55
To situate our understanding of how the hindsight bias might affect the capital
markets, imagine that a corporation is considering, at time T0, whether to disclose the
existence of a risk of a strike that will close one of its factories, and (if it occurs) create a
very modest downturn in profits. The risk of the strike at timeT 0 is miniscule – a
the experience of losing your life savings in the stock market because you are unable to assess the risk of an
investment. This reduces to an intuition that while gambling is primarily experienced as an entertaining
spectacle, capital investing is not.
52
See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinksi, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, in
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra n. 22, at 95 (describing cognitive and motivational factors
creating the bias); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation?, 79
OR. L. REV. 61, 67-70 (2000) (discussing bias); Korobkin and Ulen, supra n. 32, at 1095-100. In one
example, two groups of individuals were confronted with a problem involving a railroad accident. The first
group was to assume that they were regulators, tasked to determine whether a corporation should make
repairs pursuant to regulation to avoid a railroad accident. Others were asked to assume they were jurors,
after the accident had occurred, and asked about the necessity of punitive damages. Thirty-eight percent
(38%) of the regulators recommended the repairs, while (subject to hindsight bias) sixty-seven percent
(67%) of jurors recommended punitive damages. CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW
JURIES DECIDE 100-108 (2002). The experimenters noted that the problem of hindsight bias is an "almost
inevitable" result of citizen control over legal decisions. Id. at 108.
53
Gulatiet al., supra n. 23, at 773. In this important recent article, Gulati et al. test two hypothesis which
could explain why courts have advanced the theory of fraud by hindsight: to debias limitations on human
judgment like hindsight bias; or, alternatively, to dispose of troublesome and complicated cases. They
conclude that the latter hypothesis finds more support. Id. at 818.
54
Scott A. Hawkins & Reid Hastie, Hindsight: Biased Judgments of Past Events After Outcomes Are
Known, 107 PSYCHOL. BULL. 311, 311-14 (1990).
55
Beth Azar, Blinded By Hindsight, 31 MON. PSYCH. 5 (May 2000).
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contemporaneous email between managers puts the risk at 1%. Given the riskdiscounted cost,56 the corporation decides to hide the possibility of the strike from its
investors.
The strike occurs at time T1, with the expected, minor, effect on profitability. The
corporation’s stock falls (T2),57 and the corporation is sued by disgruntled shareholders
for failing to disclose the risk (T3).
Should a jury, considering the corporation’s potential liability for this omission at
T4, consider as important to the decision of an investor at T0, the strike’s occurrence at
T1? No.58 The fact that a later event comes to pass makes no difference to the investing
decision at the time of disclosure, just as my hitting a red six while playing roulette does
not make that number the "smart" choice before the fact. That is, if a "reasonable
investor" means "an investor who thinks without bias about risk," the legal system would
want to find a way to prevent plaintiffs from successfully asserting this kind of claim in a
securities suit. BLE, however, seems to demonstrate that juries are usually unable to
reject this kind of thinking: we are all subject to hindsight bias regarding materiality. The
question then becomes – as I address below – should judges prohibit the hindsight
inference by taking the case away from the jury by applying the doctrine of presumed
immateriality?59
b.

Representativeness Heuristic

56

That is, the probability of loss times the magnitude of harm resulting from loss is small compared to the
burden of disclosure (whether measured in incremental terms or even in lost negotiating leverage with the
union).
57
Or, it doesn't. See infra Part III (discussing the (im)materiality of price change).
58
Gulati et al., supra n. 23, at 789.
59
A question is why judges would be any better than juries at avoiding the effects of hindsight. See W. Kip
Viscusi, Juries, Judges, and the Mistreatment of Risk by the Courts, 30 J. LEG. STUD. 107 (2001)
(discussing problems judges have in evaluating risk).
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BLE teaches that individuals also have a great deal of trouble shedding the effects
of the "representiveness heuristic" by which they overestimate the relationship between
what things are and what they appear to be.60
A famous experiment demonstrating this effect presented subjects with a
description of a woman with "feminist characteristics." Experimenters then asked the
subjects a relatively odd question: is the woman more likely to be (a) a bank teller; or (b)
a feminist bank teller. Logically, (a) must be more common than (b) (because of base
rate – there must be more bank tellers than political bank tellers, and more political bank
tellers than feminist ones). Nevertheless, because respondents were unable to shed the
effect of what they had already known about the woman, 90% of them
chose answer
(b).61
The representativeness heuristic appears to hold even when investors discover or
have reason to know that inform
a tion is unreliable.62 Thus, despite facts suggesting
fraud, investors will act on the representations of a broker who they know (or have reason
to know) has a motive to lie to them, because that broker had previously demonstrated
some characteristics of a reliable source.63 Similarly, investors will trade on gossip from
internet chat rooms, if the gossiping source displays some characteristics of being a
corporate insider (such as, for example, purported knowledge of corporate trivia "inside

60

See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgments of and by Representativeness, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCER TAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 84 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); See also Hanson &
Kysar, supra n. 22, at 664-669.
61
Id. at 92-93.
62
See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment of Representativeness, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra n. 60, at 7-11 (people make the same predictions about future
events irregardless of how much they trust the information that founds their conclusions).
63
See Prentice, supra n. 31, at 368-9.
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baseball" discussions of politics within the company). Needless to say, academics have
questioned whether rational investors could possibly have found such hype credible.64
To illustratehow this heuristic work s in the capital markets, suppose a
shareholder is told by her broker to invest in a particular stock. The shareholder has had
experiences with that broker, and believes him to be a truth-telling, upstanding
professional. Along with his recommendation, the broker passes her a prospectus
containing written warnings about the stock’s performance, together with financials that
(had the shareholder read them) would have cast doubt on the broker’s representations.
Economically rational investors should pass on the recommendation. However,
the representative heuristic suggests that most investors will invest based on their
previous dealings with the broker, unable to shed old illusions in the face of contrary new
information.
c.

Risk Tolerance

Individuals are risk-seeking in avoidingcurrent losses.65 Loss aversion is a
common (and depressingly familiar) phenomenon. We hold "under water" stocks for
longer that we ought, in the hope of reversing the tide.66 Readers who do not participate
in the stock market may be familiar with the phenomenon in other settings: deciding to
"press your luck" by returning to the ATM machine when down while gambling; being
unable to imagine (that is, being unwilling to confront the risk of) unlikely future

64

See Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral Approach to
Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135, 157 (2002).
65
See, e.g., Prentice, supra n. 31, at 364; See also Terrance Odean, Volume, Volatility and Profit When All
Traders Are Above Average, 1887 J. FIN. 934 (1998) (discussing tendency of individual investors to buy
the same number of winning and losing stocks, but to sell winning stocks at a higher rate).
66
See Choi and Pritchard, supra n. 21, at13.
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catastrophic losses; 67 or refusing to sell your house for years longer than necessary in the
hope/expectation that of eventually getting "your money" back.
BLE tells us a different story with respect to gains: individuals are risk averse
when confronting a choice between certain property and potential gains. Thus, while a
rational shareholder would be equally happy to accept either of a dividend stream with a
present value of $100, or a potential rise in stock resulting in present value gains of either
0 or $200, real individuals actually prefer the certain gain.68
Loss aversion may be related to the endowment effect. 69 The endowment effect
describes the higher value we place on things we own than on those we do not. The
classic experiment involves coffee mugs. Experimenters gave a group of experimental
subjects (the "buyers") money; a second group (the "sellers") plain coffee mugs.70
Experiments asked the sellers to name the minimum price they would demand to sell
their mugs, and the buyers the maximum they would pay. Both groups were told that if
market prices were established, trades would occur. But when the results were in, no
trades were possible because the buyers who "owned" the mugs were willing to pay, on
average, only half the amount demanded by the sellers.71 This result contravenes one

67
See Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification of Contract Law: The Objective Theory of Consumer Form
Contracts, 47 U. MIA. L. REV. 1263, 1301 (1993). An interesting corollary to this principle is that
individuals, because they discount the likelihood of future losses, will be less sensitive to warnings about
such losses. See also Choi and Pritchard, supra n. 21
, at 12 (availability heuristic); Prentice, supra n. 31, at
364.
68
See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113, 124
(1996). I assume away the tax implications of the choice.
69
Also, as some have noted, there may be times when the principle of loss aversion and the endowment
effect are in tension with each other (in a sharply falling market, for example, the endowment effect would
counsel retaining stocks while the need to avoid losses would suggest selling). See Hanson and Kysar,
supra n. 22, at 690.
70
There was no coffee in the mugs. Had there been, one might fairly understand the result of the
experiment given the expected utility accompanying a full cup of coffee.
71
See Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J.
POL. ECON. 1325 (1990).
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predicted by the rational choice model – that both groups will value the mugs
identically.72
To appreciate the interaction of these principles, imagine a few disclosures by a
corporation thathas r ecently had a run of very bad luck. It states that "things are looking
up"; that "we have no reason to expect that current bad trends will continue"; and "the
future is bright." While rational shareholders would ignore such meaningless boasts, real
shareholders might not because they are subject to loss aversion. By contrast,
shareholders whose holdings have recently appreciated may overreact to relatively
innocuous earnings warnings, seeking to "take" sure gains instead of facing the risk of
losing them.
d.

Overconfidence.

Have you ever made (to yourself, in the privacy of your home) one of the
following statements: I am a better driver than average;73 I am a better cook than
average; I am a better dancer than average.74 Join the club. Most citizens (90% of
drivers) believe they possess better skills than the norm.75 Similarly, most investors think
they will beat the market. Most people are mistaken.76 BLE teaches that investors
believe that "good things are more likely than average to happen to [their stock] and bad
things are less likely than average to happen to [it]."77

72

See Korobkin and Ulen, supra n. 32, at 1108,n.235.
But I am!
74
In the face of persuasive anecdotal (or statistical) evidence to the contrary.
75
See Robert H. Frank, Why Is Cost-Benefit Analysis So Controversial?, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 913, 929
(2000).
76
Assuming that the capital markets are efficient over the long term, no investor can regularly exceed
market returns. To the extent that markets are inefficient over the short term, fully rational or especially
savvy investors may take profits. But, by definition, not all investors can be fully rational or especially
savvy.
77
Korobkin and Ulen, supra n. 32, at 1091; See also Lynn Stout, The Investor Confidence Game, 68
BROOK. L. REV. 407, 420-26 (2002) (discussing investor overconfidence as a function of trust).
73
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Investors in particular put too much weight on "privately acquired information"
and are unable to fairly judge their ability to exceed the market.78 A classic example of
investor overconfidence is the prevalence of so-called "day-traders" in the late 1990s’
market bubble.79 These traders were known for their short patience with holding stock
and high trading volume. Day traders, disproportionately young men, achieved
notoriously low returns relative to the broader market indexes.80
Applying this bias is easy. Assume that every corporation in a segment of the
farming industry announces on the same day a possible investigation by the FTC into a
price fixing conspiracy. Each company proclaims its innocence. An investor holds stock
in Corporation GiantFarm, one of the companies named by the FTC, and must decide
whether to sell her stock. Overoptimistic thinking leads to the following internal
conversation: "Each company asserts its innocence. But good things are more likely to
happen to me and the corporations I own than to others and the corporations they own.
Therefore, GiantFarm is not as likely to be crooked as others in the farming industry. I
will hold on to my stock for a while yet."
e.

Experiential Thinking

These problems with risk analysis appear to be without a unifying theme.
However, they may be harmonized when we consider the emotional content of risk
perception. BLE teaches that individuals make decisions through two distinct methods: a

78

See Langevoort, supra n. 64, at 146.
Choi and Pritchard, supra n. 21, at 11; Denis J. Hilton, Psychology and the Financial Markets:
Applications to Understanding and Remedying Irrational Decision-Making, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
ECONOMIC DECISIONS VOLUME I: RATIONALITY AND WELL BEING 276 (Brocas and Carrillo eds. 2003)
(discussing day trading and overconfidence generally).
80
See Choi and Pritchard, supra n. 21, at 12.
79
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"rational system"; and an "emotionally driven experiential system."81 The former
decisions are "logical, deliberate and abstract."82
Because the "rational system" is so complex and demands cognitive resources
from other tasks, individuals "typically rely" on a more emotional method of decision
making associated with "intuitive judgments, emotional responses, and other subtle,
nonconscious reactions to stimuli."83 Using "experiential thinking," individuals process
risk using an "affect" consisting of that individual’s preexisting emotional construct.
For example, a feeling of "dread" may be associated with certain technologies
(like genetic manipulation), and individuals’ perceptions of risks of that technology are
accordingly increased.84 On the other hand, if individuals have a preexisting emotional
positive feeling about a technology (like, for example, miniature computers), then the
risks associated with further developments in that technological area may be perceived to
be smaller than they really are (e.g., risks of nanotechnology.) The "affect" associated
with risk judgment is strongly influenced by demographic factors.85 Risk perception is
culturally dependant.86
Thus, when a corporation discloses a risk, individuals may perceive it as either
vastly more important than it "objectively" is, or much less important, depending on its
accompanying affect.87 Individual shareholders are bad scientists. Risks that may seem

81

Hanson & Kysar, supra n. 22, at 669-672.
Id. at 669.
83
Id. at 669.
84
Id. at 670; See also Hilton, supra n. 79, at 284 (collecting studies).
85
See infra Part IV.
86
PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK, RISK SOCIETY AND POLICY SERIES (Earthscan, 2000).
87
A third option, that emotional affect has no corresponding effect is also plausible.
82
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"trivial" to courts in the cold light of day can be accompanied by a large emotional heft
for shareholders at the time of disclosure.88
2.

Trouble with Information Processing

A second category of BLE research deals with individuals’ inabilities to process
information in rational ways. This research questions how humans try to differentiate
relevant from irrelevant information and prioritize what to focus on. Some examples
follow.
a. Source Blindness.
BLE research has disclosed that even when individuals are convinced of the
veracity of contrary information, they change their views slowly in the face of persuasive
evidence; that is, new information is processed against the background of what came
before.89
As we saw before, investors are particularly likely to believe analyst reports when
those reports are affected by the representativeness heuristic.90 However, where investors
look at analyst reports absent a personal connection with the broker, they are still unable
to discount the potential biases and ignorance of the analysts, despite reasons to believe
such problems are severe.91 Nevertheless, scholars often assert that reliance on analyst
reports is irrational.92

88

In other areas of the law, judges apply this insight, recalling, for example, that "[d]etached reflection
cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife." Brown v. U.S., 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921).
89
Langevoort, supra n. 64, at 144.
90
See supra Section I(1)b
91
See Nowicki, supra n. 17, at 1327 n.78; Hilton, supra n. 79
, at 278 (collecting literature).
92
John C. Coffee, Jr., Security Analyst Litigation, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 20, 2001, at 5; Nowicki, supra n. 17, at
1327 (discussing arguments).
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Individuals also consistently overweigh the importance of oral information (a
heuristic which is especially problematic in the securities context).93 Therefore, investors
who hear about a stock through a report on television will be more influenced to buy (or
sell) than those who merely read a prospectus.94 Similarly, investors who listen to
"analyst calls" will be affected disproportionately: oral representations have "significantly
more persuasive impact than written disclaimers contained in a subsequently signed
contract."95
b.

The Framing Effect

Significantly, perceptions of risks and benefits are subject to manipulation by
corporations because of the existence of the so-called "framing effect." The classic
experiment with respect to framing presented subjects with a very hard problem:they
were asked to select between treatment programs for a disease otherwise marked by a
100% mortality rate (with a 600 person population infected).96 There were four
programs:
•

Program A:

•

Program B: 33.3% chance that the entire population will be saved; 66.6%
chance that none of the population will be saved.97

•

Program C:

•

Program D: 33.3% chance that none of the population will die; 66.6% chance
that the entire population will die.

200 people will be saved.

400 people will die.

93

Prentice, supra n. 31, at 348-9; 369-371.
STEVEN R. DROZDECK & KARL F. GRETZ, THE BROKER'S EDGE: HOW TO SELL SECURITIES IN ANY
MARKET 222 (1995) (letter delivers 7 percent of the message conveyed in a face-to-face presentation), cited
in Prentice, supra n. 31, at 370.
95
Prentice, supra n. 31, at 370.
96
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOL. 341, 343 (1984).
97
Amoes Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. BUS. § 251, §
255 (1986).
94
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Rational actors, seeking to maximize lives saved, would be indifferent between
these choices, as they result in the same predicted outcome: 200 lives saved, 400 lives
lost.98 However, when one group of subjects was asked to choose between programs A
and B, 72% chose A; when a second group was asked to choose between C and D, 78%
chose D.99 Why? Because of "framing effects." A is preferable to B because it
guarantees lives saved (recall the preference for guaranteed gains discussed above); C is
less attractive than D because it guarantees lives lost (recall the risk-seeking preferences
of individuals with respect to avoiding future losses).100
Some researchers suggest that a "cognitive-affective tradeoff" produces the framing
effect.101 Experiments have shown that a person expends more cognitive effort when "choosing
a guaranteed gain" than when "selecting a risky gain."102 In general, people expend both little
cognitive and affective efforts when confronted with a guaranteed gain.103 Consequently, they
tend to prefer a guaranteed gain over a risky one. This choice suggests that people seek to avoid
"the cognitive cost involved in evaluating a gain and the emotions involved in imagining an
uncertain reward."104 On the other hand, a person expends an equal amount of cognitive effort

98

Hanson & Kysar, supra n. 22, at 644.
Kahneman and Tversky, Choices, supra n. 96, at 343.
100
Hanson & Kysar, supra n. 22, at 644-45. In another experiment, investors were presented with two
retirement funds with different risk profiles: bonds (relatively safe) and stocks (relatively risky). The
employees were shown the historical data on the returns of each fund (and thus should have been able to
confirm the expected outcomes and risk profiles). However, the data was framed differently. One group of
employees only received one-year returns, the other group was shown a simulated 30-year distribution.
Almost all the employees seeing the longer distribution invested in more risky return, and visa versa. Jolls,
Sunstein & Thaler, supra n. 39,at 1534.
101
Cleotilde Gonzales, Jason Dana, Hideya Koshino, and Marcel Just, The Framing Effect and Risky Decisions:
Examining Cognitive Functions with fMRI, 26 Journal of Economic Psychology, 1, 4 (2005).
102
Id. at 13.
103
Id. at 15.
104
Id.
99
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when selecting a "guaranteed loss" as she does when selecting a "riskyloss, "105 suggesting an
organic cause for risk seeking in the face of losses.
Frames are obviously quite significant when thinking about corporate disclosure
in the securities fraud context.106 Information about losses will be discounted if framed
as a mere future probability; information about gains will be overemphasized when
presented as a certain near term result.107
c.

Information Overload

Rational shareholders are presumptively able to evaluate the thousandth page in a
prospectus just as wellas the first. However, BLE experimental results teach us that as a
decision maker is given more information, decision quality increases up to a point, but
eventually declines.108
This result is predicted by the theory of bounded rationality: rationality bounded
on the one hand by the context and content of the task we are facing and on the other by
our own cognitive limitations.109 As a result of information overload, shareholders may
rely on heuristics to permit them to make better decisions, such as choosing a fund based
on its managers instead of its fundamentals.110
3. Social Investing
105

Id.
See, e.g., Hilton, supra n. 79, at 288-293 (discussing psychological insights for financial products
marketing efforts).
107
Thus, corporations are rewarded by the market for engaging in accounting techniques that maximize
short term gains. See Henry T.C. Hu, Corporate Governance: Buffet, Corporate Objectives, and the
Nature of Sheep, 19 CARD. L. REV. 379, 386 (1997).
108
Paredes, supra n. 26, at 441;but see David M. Grether et al., The Irrelevance of Information Overload:
An Analysis of Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 278-294 (1986) (arguing that information
overload is irrelevant because people adopt simplified decisionmaking procedures to cope with increased
information); Korobkin and Ulen, supra n. 32, at 1078 (describing experiments where subjects were less
likely to maximize their utility when purchasing a house as the number of its attributes increased beyond
ten).
109
Paredes, supra n. 26, at 435.
110
Choi and Pritchard, supra n. 21, at 13 (noting that such a heuristic may be rational, as managing
underwriters with particular experience might be better at avoiding fraud).
106
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Thus far, I have discussed investing and irrational investors as if they acted in a
vacuum, making (bad) decisions from the comfort of their study, isolated from other
people. But, this picture of investing is highly unrealistic. Investors run in herds.
Indeed, "[w]hat explains fads like Beanie Babies and Pokemon?"111 Why do
laugh tracks work; why does a commercial telling us that a detergent is "best selling"
cause us to buy it? Why did investors participate in the Dutch Tulip market bubble?
These questions can be answered, in part, by analyzing investor "herd behavior," whereby
each investor devolves to another the decision to invest in the market, resulting in
stampedes as market followers follow market leaders.112
There is evidence of herd behavior in capital markets: investors following others
into popular portfolios, conventional stocks, and suboptimal bond issues.113 However,
the actual mechanism for such movement is quite obscure.114 There is also evidence that
herd behavior decreases as market sophistication increases.115 As some scholars have
noted, the prevalence of herd behavior may be explained in terms of network externalities
– some products and stocks become more valuable as more people use them (the common
example is a personal computer,116 but a more relevant example for readers may be the
BARBRI exam review course).117

111

Bainbridge, supra n. 38, at 1037-38.
Prentice, supra n. 31, at 373.
113
Bainbridge, supra n. 38, at 1038.
114
Langevoort, supra n. 64, at 159.
115
Bainbridge, supra n. 38, at 1039-40; Zohar Gosher and Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of
Securities Regulation, Working Paper No. 259, The Columbia Law School Center for Law and Economic
Studies, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=600709, at 16 (arguing that one group of market participants,
"noise traders" engage in herd behavior and are competitively disadvantaged vis a vis more sophisticated
investors).
116
Bainbridge, supra n. 38, at 1041.
117
That is, as more students use BARBRI, its usefulness in helping students pass the Bar, a curved exam,
increases. The reason is that if the majority of students believe that X is the answer to a given question
(when it is not) failure to know that answer will not hurt a student's chances to pass. The interesting thing
112
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Some explain the case of Jonathan Lebed, a New Jersey teenager who allegedly
bought stock in small companies and then hyped those companies on the internet, as a
story of herd behavior.118 The SEC prosecuted Lebed on the theory that shareholders had
relied on his false hype in purchasing shares, but reached a settlement.119 Is this an
example of individual investors following others in investing in penny stocks without
thought? Perhaps so, but it also demonstrates the pernicious effects of the
representativeness heuristic and source blindness, as explained above.
In sum, BLE teaches that individual investors are unlikely to respond rationally to
corporate disclosures: their behavior depends heavily on the context and presentation of
disclosures.
Part II:

Empirical Analysis of Materiality

The materiality element in securities law requires the decision maker to reach
conclusions about the way investors behave in response to corporate action. The
"reasonable" part of the standard's definition suggests that the decision maker need not be
a jury, because some behaviors will be so "unreasonable" as to be resolvable as a matter
of law. Materiality, then, creates a need for courts to articulate and defend a series of
commitments and assumptions about how investors act.
My thesis is that courts, in analyzing securities law, generally adhere to the
foundational assumption of corporate law: investors act rationally.120 Presumed
immateriality functions as a channeling doctrine to exclude from the universe of

about this claim is that it proves too much: if all students took BARBRI, the BARBRI-effect would
disappear.
118
See generally Richard Walker & David Levine, You've Got Jail: Current Trends in Internet Securities
Fraud, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 405 (2001) (extensive discussion of Lebed case).
119
Langevoort, supra n. 64, at 156.
120
See infra text accompanying notes 26 through 37.
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meritorious cases those in which plaintiffs’ behavior, if proven, would be different from
the behavior predicted by the rational investor model. But as I just discussed, BLE
teaches us that individuals do not process disclosures rationally; courts’ equation of
reasonableness with rationality is essentially a normative move.
This policy choice can be brought to light through empirical analysis of a large
sample of federal securities law cases. Empiricism is particularly helpful here because
courts’ words are so at odds with their words. When courts first introduced presumed
immateriality, they argued it would protect investors against managers’ overreacting to
liability concerns and "bury[ing] the shareholders in an avalanche of trivial information –
a result that is hardly conducive to informed decisionmaking."121 That is, presumed
immateriality was said to be an attempt to set appropriate corporate disclosure activity
levels: too much activity overly burdens corporations without a corresponding increased
benefit to investors.
If the cases followed the language of courts’ opinions, and managing corporate
activity was courts’ actual goal, several empirical results wouldfollow.
•

Presumed immateriality would be rare, as courts say that it is.

•

Presumed immateriality would vary with changes in political control
(more enforcement, less presumed immateriality) as courts work to
smooth effects on corporate activity.

•

Presumed immateriality would be sensitive to procedure, because to
accurately change activity levels, courts ought to letplaint iffs’ allegations
of reliance on false disclosures proceed to trial unless persuasive evidence
is submitted to the contrary.122 Therefore, there should be relatively fewer
findings of presumed immateriality earlier in the life of a lawsuit (i.e.

121

TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 448.
Overuse of presumed immateriality results in insufficient enforcement (and, therefore, under-disclosure); under
use of presumed immateriality has the opposite effect.

122
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fewer such decisions on motions to dismiss and more on motions for
summary judgment).123
•

There would be no significant difference between government and private
plaintiff win rates on the materiality issue. To understand this claim,
recall that both the government and private plaintiffs need to satisfy the
identical objective test: would a reasonable shareholder have been moved
by the allegedly misleading disclosure. Government suits should,
presumably, have similar effects on corporate activity levels as private
plaintiff suits.124 Therefore, the rate at which courts dismiss any
disclosure as immaterial (among many offered in each suit) should be
unaffected by a plaintiff's identity.

As we will see, each of these predictions turns out to be false, suggesting that
courts’ applications of presumed immateriality are doing something other than merely
affecting corporate behavior. Indeed, the data leads me to conclude that use of this
doctrine results in incentives that are profoundly in tension with BLE, thus rewarding
individuals for acting in ways inconsistent with ordinary intuitions.
I began my empirical project by first defining the universe: federal courts
applying the "reasonable shareholder" standard over the past thirty years, after the
Supreme Court issued TSC Industries.125 Because the number of cases was

123

Some might object that this hypothesis ignores the effects of settlement. Obviously, most securities
cases settle. Private plaintiff suits were represented in my dataset as follows: 44% resolved motions to
dismiss stage; 23% motions for summary judgment; and 17% appeals. The remainder of cases had mixed
procedural postures, were post-trial motions, or were cases seeking injunctive relief. This data suggests
that around half of cases disappear at each of the two major stages in the life of a securities lawsuit: after
motion to dismiss, and after summary judgment. These disappearing cases are either being settled or
dismissed outright.
One way the settlement effect could play out is that cases later in the life of a lawsuit are relatively
more likely to be weaker (because "stronger" cases will settle earlier). But this seems too simple an
analysis. There are many factors influencing the likelihood of settlement: the amount at stake; plaintiffs'
counsel resources; defendants' resources; the involvement of the court with settlement discussions; the
tolerance of the defendant for publicity. There is no reason, in the aggregate, to believe that the fact most
cases settle should distort judge's findings of immateriality. Cf. Krawiec & Zeiler, supra n. 5, at 43
(discussing effect of settlement in common law disclosure context).
124
For a further discussion of this issue, See infra at text accompanying notes 215 through 219.
125
I ran the following search on the Westlaw databases for the Second Circuit, the Southern District of
New York, the Eastern District of New York, the Western District of New York, the Northern District of
New York, the District of Connecticut, and the District of Vermont: "'108 S.Ct. 978' or '426 U.S. 438' or
'485 U.S. 224' or '96 S.Ct. 2126' and rational! reasonable! lay ordinary intelligen! average /1 shareholder
stockholder investor." This search thus tests for citations to either TSC Industries or Basic when courts
also analyze any of the possible variants on the materiality standard. I used the citations because different
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overwhelmingly large, I limited my analysis to cases arising in the Second Circuit and its
district courts.126 The resulting data set, from 1976 through the end of November 2004,127
was 471 cases.128 In 88 cases, there was no actual finding that anydisclosure was
material, possibly material, or immaterial.129 I then coded (by marking information on a
separate page)130 the remaining 383 cases.131 It is important to note that this dataset is not
entirely complete and sampling issues may have skewed my results.132

courts might use distinct abbreviations and bluebook forms for case names. Undoubtedly, there are some
cases even within the Second Circuit which treat the subject of materiality, but do not cite either TSC
Indus. or Basic. See, e.g., Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.1986) (analyzing materiality, announcing
the "bespeaks caution" doctrine, but not citing either TSC or Basic). I can think of no reason why cases
citing the Supreme Court standard are more likely to find disclosures material or immaterial. The sample
should be fairly representative.
126
This limitation makes sense for three reasons. First, the Second Circuit and its Southern District are
widely recognized as uniquely expert in securities law cases. See Bainbridge and Gulati, supra n. 5, at 85
n.6. Second, the sample provided the largest subset of any of the federal circuits. The next closest sample,
the Ninth Circuit and its attendant courts, would have yielded under two hundred cases. An "Allfeds"
search of the same terms yields 1,628 results; the Second Circuit sample provides approximately one-fourth
of the total universe of cases. Third, because the Second Circuit is smaller (in terms of number of appellate
judges and appellate decisions) than the Ninth, district courts are more constrained in their interpretation of
the materiality standard, removing or reducing a variable (possible inconsistency within a given time period
due to appellate incoherence) which I would otherwise have needed to account for.
127
The same search would produce more cases today. From December 2004 through January 2005, four
more cases would have been added to the database.
128
Because courts are more likely to write opinions when granting summary judgment or a motion to
dismiss, Westlaw does not (yet) catalogue orders, and because the older cases in the database are likely to
comprise mostly "published" cases, my sample overrepresents the absolute percentage of determinations of
presumed immateriality in securities cases. However, insofar as securities law cases are more likely to
result in opinions than other causes of action (because of the length and complexity of the pleadings, and
the repeat-player advocates), this concern may be overstated.
129
Such cases fall into many categories. For example, courts routinely analogize TSC Industries and Basic
in deciding the materiality of contract or common law fraud claims. Courts also routinely cite the
materiality standard, but then proceed to decide a securities fraud case on difference grounds – e.g., no duty
to disclose, no standing, statute of limitations, failure to satisfy the "in connection with" requirement, etc.
130
For each case, I marked on a separate coding sheet: (1) the date; (2) if the decision was published or
unpublished; (3) jurisdiction; (4) procedural posture; (5) if there was a finding that any of the disclosures
considered should be dismissed pursuant to presumed immateriality; (6) the number of disclosures at issue
in the materiality analysis; (7) if any such disclosures remained for later materiality determination; and (8)
the kinds of techniques used to find disclosures immaterial as a matter of law.
131
I undertook the initial coding. I skimmed each case (there were approximately 12,000 pages in the
dataset) until I found the discussion of materiality, and then read that section with some care. My research
assistant, Ms. Yevglevskaya-Wayne, entered the data I had written onto the coding sheet into an excel
spreadsheet. I asked her to read independently each case in which I had marked a finding of presumed
immateriality. When she disagreed with my initial coding, we discussed the case and reached a consensus
about a proper treatment. This method resulted in discussion of approximately 100 cases. I made the final
determination as to the proper coding of every case.
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I was particularly interested in exploring the reasons courts gave for applying the
presumed immateriality doctrine, because the reasons for decisions help us understand
the model of human behavior courts apply when determining which investors are
"reasonable" and which are not. Drawing from some recent scholarship,133 and
developing new categories of my own, I divided such reasons into eight general doctrinal
techniques.
The discussion in this part, then, is organized into two sets of findings. First, I
observe the scope of the doctrine at a general level, dividing that section into four subparts: effect of time on presumed immateriality; effect of party identity; regression of
After the initial run of coding, I made an additional run through of the data set to locate cases resolving
preliminary injunctions before trial, a procedural posture I had originally not coded for. The original data
collection sheets are in my possession, and are available on request, as is an appendix containing my coding
of each of the cases.
132
There are three categories of problems.
First, there is the sampling problem. Only dispositions with written opinions are represented on Westlaw;
Westlaw collected fewer opinions in the past than today. Courts denying summary judgment or a motion to
dismiss are less likely to write an opinion (because of the minimal likelihood of interlocutory appeal). See
generally Michael J. Davidson, A Modest Proposal: Permit Interlocutory Appeals of Summary Judgment
Denials, 147 MIL. L. REV. 145, 149 n.23 (1995) (denial of summary judgment not generally subject to
immediate appeal). Because findings of presumed immateriality are positively correlated with grants of
summary judgment or a motion to dismiss, my results contain a higher proportion of "presumed
immateriality" findings than actually exist, although the effect will be more pronounced for recent cases.
There may be a further wrinkle, in that motions to dismiss may be relatively more likely to result in an
opinion in a securities case than a motion for summary judgment. See Bainbridge and Gulati, supra n. 5, at
116 n.94 (concluding that securities decisions on motions to dismiss are likely to be published). Motions
for summary judgment, unlike motions to dismiss, if denied, will often be denied by order (because the
court knows that a trial will follow, resulting in post-trial motions and a need to write what would be a
repetitive opinion). Thus, as compared to a universe containing all dispositions, I should find a higher
percentage of findings of presumed immateriality on summary judgment versus motions to dismiss. See
also Krawiec & Zeiler, supra n. n.5 , at 41-43 (discussing problems with collection of opinions on
Westlaw.) Given the increased prevalence of electronic dockets in the federal courts, it should be possible
to construct an error index comparing the rates of opinions on Westlaw to every disposition made by the
court.
Second, there is a search problem. I only looked for cases that cited to Basic and/or TSC Industries. There
are cases analyzing materiality which did not cite these landmark decisions (just as there are cases
analyzing summary judgment that do not cite the Supreme Court's Celotex trilogy). But I can think of no
reason why citing to these decisions would make a court more or less likely to make a finding of presumed
immateriality. Moreover, failing to cite these seminal cases suggests a certain degree of haste, and would
have potentially made it harder to discern a court's reasoning.
Third, some cases appeared at multiple places in my dataset. I coded for each decision as a separate event.
Although I hoped to have a separate analysis of just the repeated cases, there proved to be too few to
support any statistically relevant conclusions.
133
Bainbridge and Gulati, supra n. 5, at 119-125.
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variables; and effect of procedure. Second, I discuss the relationship between presumed
immateriality techniques, and their scope and change over time.
1.

General Findings
a. Presumed immateriality over Time

I first tested the changes in frequency of court findings of presumed immateriality
over time.134 I divided the cases in my dataset into six time periods, with the effect of
segregating cases that had been decided under distinct legal frameworks (e.g., cases
before and after the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Basic v. Levinson and before
and after the 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act). Each time period contained
a roughly similar number of cases. 135 The relationship between time and findings of
immateriality follows in Figure 1.

134

Krawiec & Zeiler's paper on common law disclosure duties also tested for the relationship between disclosure
and time. See Krawiec & Zeiler, supra n. n. 5, at 77-78. As in this paper, they grouped decisions into periods of
several years.
135
The number of cases in each period are displayed below:
Years in Period
Number of Cases
1976-1980
60
1981-1986
66
1987-1991
63
1992-1995
49
1995-1999
70
2000-2004
75
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Figure 1: Total Cases Over Time
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Figure 1 demonstrates that presumed immateriality has increased in frequency in
recent years. However, a percentage breakdown (Figure 2) tells a different story:
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Figure 2: Percentage of Presumed Immateriality Over Time
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As Figure 2 demonstrates, findings of presumed immateriality were especially high in the
first years following TSC Industries (in 1976). Findings of presumed immateriality
decreased from 1986 through 1991136 to a low of 41%, and then rose to a high of 49%
from 1992 through 1995, before flat-lining in recent years.137 Overall, in the studied
period, 44% of cases contained at least one finding of presumed immateriality. This

136

An explanation for this decrease is that it coincides with the years after the Supreme Court issued Basic,
which self-consciously rejected bright-line tests for materiality which (presumably) were increasingly the
likelihood that courts found disclosures immaterial as a matter of law.
137
Why? There are many possibilities. The one that is most tempting is that there were a higher
percentage of especially "weak" securities fraud claims in the years before 1995, leading courts to throw
higher percentages of cases out of court. Legislative reaction, in the form of the 1995 Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA"), resulted in a consolidation in the securities fraud counsel industry, and,
possibly, a smaller percentage of cases that contained nonmeritorious claims. See Bruce H. Kobayashi &
Larry E. Ribstein, Class Action Lawyers as Lawmakers, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 733 (2004) (regarding growth in
class action firms). Therefore, courts' role in shaping securities fraud became less exigent, and the
percentage of cases finding presumed immateriality dropped to the 1980s levels. But, in the absence of a
statistically significant change, all such explanations appear premature.
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figure is significantly higher than the cautionary language of TSC and Basic would lead
us to expect.138
However, on further examination of this variance in findings of presumed
immateriality,139 there was no statistically significant relationship between presumed
immateriality and time.140 That is, although changes in courts' applications of presumed
immateriality may be practically important, we cannot attribute them to factors other than
chance.141
b. Effect of Party Identity
While coding cases, I quickly noticed the important effect of party identity on judicial
findings of presumed immateriality. The United States brought 61 of the 383 cases resulting in a
decision on materiality.142 In only four of these cases (7%) did courts presume immateriality.
Government plaintiffs prevailed on this issue much more often than private plaintiffs: 93%
versus 49%. This difference was strongly statistically significant.143 I display private plaintiff
presumed immateriality rates in Figure 3:

138

Although it is somewhat lower than the percentages found in one recent study. See Bainbridge and
Gulati,supra n. 5, at 116, n.94 (63% of cases finding presumed immateriality).
139
I performed a one-way analysis of variance test, where a finding of presumed immateriality was the dependant
variable, and the number of claims was 383. The P values described below are the probability "of observing any
outcome as extreme or more extreme than the observed outcomes." Krawiec & Zeiler, supra n. n. 5, at 54,n.149. P
values below 5% are traditionally required to create statistical significance. Id.
140
P=.9098. Although, as I discuss below, some of the specific presumed immateriality techniques do
demonstrate statistically significant correlations with the passage of time.
141
For a lucid discussion of the difference between practical and statistical significance, see DAVID W. BARNES,
STATISTICS AS PROOF: FUNDAMENTALS OF QUANTITATIVE EVIDENCE 143-44 (1983).
142
For the purposes of my analysis, I did not distinguish between civil and criminal enforcement actions.
143
P<.001.
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Figure 3: Private Party Presumed Immateriality
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c.

Regression Analysis

I next used a stepwise regression analysis to determine which variables most
contributed most to findings of presumed immateriality. I tested five variables:
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jurisdiction,144 procedure,145 number of disclosures plaintiffs claimed were material,146
whether the government was a party, and whether the decision had been published.147
This analysis confirmedthat the most significant variable in predicting
presumptive immateriality is whether the government is a party to the suit.148 Controlling
for party identity, the number of disclosures at issue also predicts the doctrine in a
statistically significant way.149 And, controlling for party identity and the number of
disclosures, the only remaining variable that seemed to predict findings of presumed
immateriality is procedure.150
In view of this result, I tested the remaining data excluding cases where the
government was a party to avoid having the government’s success rate overwhelm the
more subtle variables I was examining.151 That is, I wanted to determine whether there

144

There should be a higher rate of findings of presumed immateriality at the appellate level than at the district court
level, for two reasons. First, many have suggested that increased attention to securities claims should result in lower
"win" percentages for plaintiffs (as judges carefully sort through the kinds of claims that are and are not actionable).
In a sense, this is the theory of the PSLRA. See generally Joseph T. Phillips, A New Pleading Standard Under The
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act?, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 969 (2001). Second, given that district courts are
bound by appellate courts, and appellate courts frequently caution district courts not to make findings of presumed
immateriality, there should be, as a rule, more findings of presumed immateriality at the appellate level.
In the dataset, judges analyzing claims of presumed immateriality agreed with defendants 60% of the time, while at
the district court level, defendants' success rate was 49%. However, as noted in the text above, this difference was
not statistically significant. (P=.13)
145
I collected data on five different procedural possibilities: motion to dismiss or other preanswer pleading;
summary judgment; a ruling on a motion for equitable relief; post-trial opinion; and a decision resulting from an
appeal. However, for the purpose of the stepwise regression analysis, I only tested the subset of opinions resulting
from motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment.
146
I summarized this variable as (1) one, (2) two, or (3) three or more claims.
147
Federal Appellate courts decide that some cases should have precedential effect, "publishing" them. Publication,
in the district courts occurs in two ways: by court's election (communicated to Westlaw), or by Westlaw's
independent selection. See Rod Borlase, West's New Reporter,
http://www.rodborlase.com/Guides/West's%20Federal% 20Appendix.html (accessed Feb. 12, 2005). A hypothesis
is that courts are more likely to consider significant decisions that deny claims of presumed immateriality (if, as
Gulati and others have argued, the decision to find a case immaterial represents an attempt to shuck securities fraud
cases from the docket). Thus, published decisions should have lower rates of presumed immateriality than
unpublished decisions.
148
In this part of the analysis, T is significant at the .001 level.
149
At a .05 level.
150
At a .05 level.
151
Excluding government plaintiffs, the distribution of cases is:
1976-1980
49
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were any statistically interesting characteristics in that part of the dataset (consisting of
322 cases) where the plaintiff was a private party.
d. Effect of Procedure and Number of Claims
The number of claims plaintiffs assert ought to have a positive relationship with
the findings of immateriality: the more claims, the more judicial bites at the apple. And,
as expected, the number of claims has a statistically significant relationship to findings of
immateriality.152
However, the story of procedure is more complicated. I was primarily interested
in looking at the difference between courts' applications of the materiality doctrine on
motions to dismiss versus summary judgment. The numbers follow in Table 1:
Table 1: Presumed immateriality by Procedure (Private Plaintiffs Only)
Presumed Immateriality
Presumed Immateriality
(# Cases)
(% Cases)
Motions to Dismiss
140
49
Summary Judgment
74
45

Surprisingly, there are comparatively higher findings of presumed immateriality
on motions to dismiss than on summary judgment. However, when I tested if this result
was statistically significant, I found that standing alone, the difference between the
findings of presumed immateriality on summary judgment and motion to dismiss was
statistically insignificant.153 When I expanded the universe tested to include post-trial

1981-1986
1987-1991
1992-1995
1996-1999
2000-2004

54
56
43
56
64

152

P=.05. Courts considering one or two claims found presumed immateriality 46% of the time; courts considering
three or more claims found presumed immateriality 61% of the time.
153
P=.52
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motions, appeals, and motions for equitable relief, the result did not change.154 That is,
procedure simplydoes not have a statistically significant effect on presumed
immateriality.155
2.

Presumed Immateriality Techniques

When deciding to channel certain kinds of disclosures out of securities fraud
litigations, courts apply distinctive reasoning. Just as in, for example, the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine in criminal law, or "res ipsa loquitor" in tort, courts apply
shorthand labels to findings of presumed immateriality. Scholars have identified four
common techniques in recent works: (1) puffery; (2) bespeaks caution;156 (3) zero price
change; and (4) triviality.157 Four additional labels for courts’ decisions are present in the
cases: (5) failure to read; (6) fraud by hindsight;158 (7) truth on the market; and (8) failure
to understand consequences.
a. Four Traditional Materiality Techniques
First, courts dismiss certain types of statements as "mere puffery" thata
reasonable investor would ignore.159 Puffery is a "vague statement of corporate
154

P=.36
As the regression analysis demonstrates, procedure does have some residual effect on the doctrine when
controlling for party identity and number of claims. This result may be understood as a consequence of a
"suppression effect," whereby a variable in a regression which is not correlated with the independent variable, but is
highly correlated (either negatively or positively) with the other dependant variables will appear to be significant.
Here, procedure has a statistically significant relationship with each of the other dependant variables. That is, the
effect of procedure uncovered by the regression analysis is an artifact, not a reflection of an actual predictive
relationship between procedure and presumed immateriality.
156
I am only addressing common law bespeaks caution techniques, and not application of the PSLRA Safe
Harbor. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5 (2005). The Safe Harbor is not an immateriality technique, but rather a
statutorily created immunity.
157
See Bainbridge and Gulati, supra n. 5, at 119-24.
158
Bainbridge and Gulati identify fraud by hindsight as a determination which affects scienter, which it
surely does. See Bainbridge and Gulati, supra n. 5, at 127. However, as Gulati and others elsewhere have
hypothesized, fraud by hindsight might be applied by courts in determining materiality as well. Gulati et
al., supra n. 23, 788- 91. To the extent courts stated they were determining disclosures were immaterial as a
matter of law because to hold otherwise would sanction fraud by hindsight, I coded accordingly, even if
this determination is logically not related to a "true" materiality determination.
159
Bainbridge and Gulati, supra n. 5, at 94.
155
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optimism"160 that is "so obviously unimportant to a reasonable investor that reasonable
minds could not differ."161 As Judge Learned Hand described: "[t] here are some kinds of
talk which no sensible man takes seriously, and if he does he suffers from credulity."162
In a sense, puffery acts to excuse corporate overoptimism: "[p]eople in charge of an
enterprise are not required to take a gloomy, fearful or defeatist view of the future …."163
For the purposes of this article, I coded for the puffery technique whenever the
court explicitly used the word in dismissing statements as presumptively immaterial. I
also marked the technique as present when courts found statements to be presumptively
immaterial because of their vagueness, general optimism, or lack of specificity, even if
they did not use the word "puff" or "puffery." Examples include:
•

A statement by the attorney for the fighting promoter Don King, facing a

possible indictment, "that he did not expect any problems for King" was "like the claims
of campaign managers before election . . . designed to allay the suspicion which would
attend their absence than to be understood as having any relation to the objective
truth."164
•

A statement by an IBM executive during a conference call that "we’re not

– despite your anxiety – concerned about being able to cover the dividend for quite a
foreseeable time" was "plainly an expression of optimism that [was] too indefinite to be
actionable."165

160

See Jennifer O'Hare, The Resurrection of the Dodo: The Unfortunate Re-Emergence of the Puffery
Defense in Private Securities Fraud Actions, 59 OHIO ST. L. J. 1697, 1697 (1998); See generally COX AND
HAZEN, supra n. 1, at 297.
161
Ganino v. Citizens Utilities Co., 228 F.3d 154, 162 (2nd Cir. 2000) (internal quotations omitted).
162
Vulcan Metals Co. v. Simmons Mfg. Co., 248 F. 853, 856 (2d Cir. 1918).
163
Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1129-30 (2d Cir.1994).
164
World Series of Casino Gamb., Inc. v. King, 1986 WL 12525, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
165
In re IBM Sec. Lit., 163 F.3d 102, 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
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As recently as 1991, the conventional wisdom held that the puffery defense was
moribund and had "all but gone the way of the dodo,"166 although recent publications
argue that it has come back to life.167 Based on this account, I expected the puffery
doctrine would be relatively rare, and more common in the present than in the past.
Second, courts apply the so-called "bespeaks caution" doctrine, which holds that
fraud claims based on allegedly misleading predictions are cured bylater cautionary
statements.168 Unlike puffery, bespeaks caution relies on the presence of later warnings
to dismiss earlier forecasts (whether specific or vague).
In my analysis, I coded for the bespeaks caution technique when courts explicitly
used the term, and whencourts used cautionary or risk sharing statements in one part of a
disclosure to negate the importance of other disclosures, even in the absence of the words
"bespeaks caution." Examples include:
•

Investors in a limited partnership designed to produce income from oil and

gas properties alleged that the brokers had told them the investment was "low" or "no"
risk; a written brochure also stated that the partnership would feature "regular cash
distributions," "no exploration risk," and thatthe investments would "meet the needs of
income-oriented investors."169 The brochure, however, incorporated a Prospectus, which
warned that "there is a risk that estimates of future prices or costs . . . may prove to be
inaccurate," that the organizers had limited experience in assessing oil and gas properties,
and that all estimates (of risk and return) in the prospectus were "to some degree

166

LOSS & SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 3434 (3d ed. 1991);
O'Hare, supra n. 160, at 1709-11 (relying on anecdotal evidence to question that account).
168
Jennifer O'Hare, Good Faith and the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine: It's Not Just a State of Mind, 58 U.
PITT. L. REV. 619 (1997) (discussing doctrine); see also Donald C. Langevoort, Disclosures That "Bespeak
Caution," 49 BUS. LAW. 481 (1994).
169
Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, 735 F. Supp. 1196, 1198 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
167
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speculative."170 Under the bespeaks caution doctrine, any investing based on the oral or
written representations promising low risks was "clearly unreasonable."171
•

Purchasers of stock in the Donna Karan International initial public

offering alleged fraud based (in part) on statements regarding the corporation’s beauty
division, such as "the success of the Company’s fragrance products is evi denced by the
continued annual sales growth of each such product since its launch." These statements
were made when the division was losing money and posed a significant operational
problem for the corporation as a whole.172 However, the prospectus also bespoke
caution: the division had "never made money," was "not expected to make money in
1996," and was planning the "inherently risky and expensive launch of a new
fragrance."173 The earlier statements were found by the court to be presumptively
immaterial.
Scholars have observedthat the bespeaks caution technique "enjoys wide
acceptance among the courts"174 and is one of the three most important developments in
securities law in the last fifteen years.175 Bespeaks caution is supposed to have originated
in 1986.176 Based on this history, I expected the bespeaks caution doctrine to increase
sharply in use in recent years.
A third technique is the Zero Price Change. In rare cases, in the absence of
market effects from a given price change, courts determine disclosures were immaterial

170

Id. at 1201.
Id. at 1202.
172
In re Donna Karan Intern. Sec. Lit., No. 97-cv-2011, 1998 WL 637547, at *6-8 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 14,
1998).
173
Id. at * 13
174
R. Gregory Roussel, Securities Fraud or Mere Puffery: Refinement of the Corporate Puffery Defense, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1049, 1053 (1998)
175
Langevoort, supra n. 19, at 479.
176
Langevoort, supra n. 168, at 481.
171
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as a matter of law.177 Courts infer from the absence of price movement that the
disclosure was presumptively immaterial to a reasonable investor. Surprisingly, the
presumption is unilateral.178 This technique is intertwined with the causation requirement
in some securities cases (that is, plaintiffs must prove causation-in-fact; in the absence of
market movement, plaintiffs’ presumption of causation are rebutted).179 I coded for
application of this technique either when the court applied a market test, or when it noted
evidence that investors did not sell their holdings in reaction to disclosure.180 Although it
would seem the technique ought to be applied only following a price analysis which
corrected for the effects of market movement generally, and industry effects in particular,
courts seemed to be unconcerned with such niceties.181 Given the structure of the
materiality analysis, I predicted that zero price change should be a rare technique,
because the insights behind zero price change are really directed to the distinct loss
causation issue.
Fourth is the "trivial matters" technique, with which courts hold presumptively
immaterial nondisclosures relating to small percentages of total sales or revenues.182 I
coded for the application of the trivial matters technique whenever a court found that
information was too numerically or financially unimportant to be material, including

177

See Bainbridge and Gulati, supra n. 5, at 123-4.
Id. at 124.
179
See, e.g., Sand. Chef of Texas Inc. v. Reliance Natn'l Indem. Ins., 319 F.3d 205 (5th Cir. 2003)
(equating cause-in-fact requirement with actual reliance on alleged fraudulent misrepresentation); Powers
v. British Vita, P.L.C., 57 F.3d 176 (2nd Cir. 1995) (cause-in-fact of violation of securities laws is a
prerequisite for standing to sue for a RICO violation).
180
Compare Elkind v. Ligget & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 166-7 (2d Cir. 1980) (failure of institutional
investors to sell stock) with Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 56 F. Supp.2d 222, 227 (D. Conn. 1999) (court
examined NYSE trading information following disclosure and found there "was no movement in the
Citizens stock following the announcement and within days thereafter, the price of the stock increased.")
181
See, e.g. Ganino, 56 F. Supp.2d at 227; Leventhal v. Tow, 48 F. Supp.2d 104, 116 (D. Conn. 1999)
(price increase within several days of disclosure "belies claims of a 'stunning' negative disclosure of a
material nature").
182
Bainbridge and Gulati, supra n. 5, at 125.
178
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evaluations of the (un)likelihood of a future event (such as a merger). Note that while
trivial matters may look like puffery in the case of puffery, a company’s overoptimistic
statements of fact or optimism are deemed immaterial because the of the content of the
words used; here, they are immaterial based on an economic conclusion about their
relationship to the financial status of the company as a whole. Some examples follow:
•

Inflation of revenues of $217 million due to "round-trip" trading of an

energy firm represented only .3% of total revenues in the relevant time period, and, on a
motion to dismiss was therefore "immaterial as a matter of law," despite evidence of price
decline when the round-tripping allegations became public.183
•

In a suit for failure to disclose merger negotiations in a registration

statement issued pursuant to a debt offering, plaintiffs alleged that two large corporations
began merger negotiations in April, 1993, had signed confidentiality agreements, and had
agreed in principal on the ratio of shares to be exchanged and the management of a
combined company, before the negotiations broke down. At the time of the
nondisclosure, the companies "remained in contact," but were not actually negotiating.
Subsequently, the merger discussions resumed and were consummated. The possibility
of a merger was held to be too trivial to be material and thus triggering the need to
disclose. The court found that even if "one stretches the concept of preliminary
negotiations as far as it can go, remaining in contact with someone after one has broken
off formal negotiations does not seem to be included. Stated another way, to call this
state of affairs material would make just about anything at all material."184

183
184

In re Duke Energy Corp. Sec. Lit., 282 F. Supp.2d 158, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Nelson v. Paramount Comm., Inc., 872 F. Supp. 1242, 1246 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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I had no expectations about the scope of this doctrine before beginning my
analysis.
b.

The Second Set of Techniques

Fifth, courts regularly describe a failure to read a prospectus as "reckless."185 I
coded for this technique in two contexts. First, courts sometimes contrast oral statements
(alleged to be material) with written disclaimers, holding that the written disclaimer
"trumped" the oral one, making it presumptively immaterial.186 Second, and more
commonly, courts state that investors should read all parts of a given disclosure (or
related disclosures) together, and that no one statement can be evaluated in isolation.187
This technique differs from bespeaks caution in that it applies in all circumstances where
one part of the disclosure contradicts (or helps to contextualize) another part, and also in
the context of tension between oral and written statements.
I hypothesized that the failure to read technique would appear relatively
commonly in my dataset, as courts dismissed claims by investors who alleged fraud
based on oral misrepresentations.
Sixth, courts deny plaintiffs the ability to prove "fraud by hindsight."188 Courts
insist that plaintiffs plead more than simply bad outcomes, but rather that they produce
information that would have led objective parties to believe the actors had knowledge of
185

See Carr v. CIGNA Sec., Inc., 95 F.3d 544, 548 (7th Cir. 1996). But see Donald C. Langevoort, Selling
Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law and Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated
Customers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 627, 682-83 (1996) ("Ready characterization of a failure to read a dense and
detailed prospectus as "reckless" is troublesome on a number of levels. Most obviously, there is the
empirical problem. It is awkward to use the term reckless to describe behavior that is quite normal and
expected..") The SEC appears to reject the "reckless approach" of the Carr court. See In re Robert A.
Foster, 51 S.E.C. 1211, 1213 (1994) ("Those who sell securities by means of representations inconsistent
with [written disclosures] do so at their peril.")
186
See, e.g., Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, 735 F. Supp. 1196 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
187
Ferber v. The Travelers Corp., 802 F. Supp. 698, 705-06 (D.Conn. 1992)
188
Bainbridge and Gulati, supra n. 5, at 126 (fraud by hindsight goes to scienter); Gulati et al., supra n. 23, at 81618.
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fraud at the time of the nondisclosure.189 Therefore, pleadings thatdepend on an
inference that because a bad event has occurred it was more likely all along, are said to be
attempting to prove "fraud by hindsight."190 I coded for presence of fraud by hindsight
even in the absence of these magic words. 191
Previous work on this doctrine found that only 2% of cases, a "handful,"
analyzing the fraud by hindsight technique involved materiality determinations.192 My
coding was more permissive with respect to finding fraud by hindsight as a materiality
technique,193 but I still expected the doctrine to appear relatively rarely in the dataset.
The seventh technique used in finding presumed immateriality was the so-called
"truth on the market" doctrine.194 Courts apply the truth on the market technique to find
presumptively immaterial disclosures which would have provided the investor with no
information he or she could not have obtained from another publicly available source.195
For example, the Second Circuit concluded that failure to disclose a potential director's

189

Gulati et al., supra n. 23, at 781.
Judge Friendly's treatment of this issue is paradigmatic: Denny v. Barber, 576 F.2d 465, 470 (2d Cir.
1978)
191
Cf. In re Union Carbide Sec. Lit., 648 F. Supp. 1322, 1327 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (to "permit these omissions
to constitute a securities action would allow future plaintiffs to walk into court with a 'materiality through
hindsight' cause of action.").
192
Gulati et al., supra n. 23, at 807-09 (noting that a first round of coding had produced a significantly
higher numbers of cases).
193
I generally coded for applications of a given technique based on what the court itself said it was doing
(i.e., if a determination is made in the "materiality" section, it was a materiality determination). If a court
said it was making a materiality determination, while clearly making a determination about the nonexistence of a duty to disclose, my coding reflected it as a nondetermination of materiality. Gulati,
Rachlinski and Langevoort similarly "scrutinized" the text to attempt to discern the real reasons for a
court's decision, and changed an initial determination of 30% to 2%. Id. at 807. Because of structural
advantages embedded in the Gulati paper (experience, acumen and numbers of researchers) it is probably
fair to assume that their "corrections" of materiality determinations are more "accurate" in some objective
sense than mine. However, there are two points to note. First, it is relatively astonishing that the courts in
the Gulati sample were apparently so confused about the intersection between materiality and fraud by
hindsight. See id. at 822-23 (explaining courts' confusion about securities doctrine and fraud by hindsight).
Second, my sample should have contained a greater number of fraud by hindsight cases in general, because
I coded for that doctrine whether or not it was specifically so identified.
194
Ganino, 228 F.3d at 167.
195
See generally COX AND HAZEN, supra n. 1, at 297 (discussing truth on the market doctrine).
190
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problems with organized labor, which might otherwise be a material omission, was
presumptively immaterial because "the difficulties were reported countrywide in the
press and on radio and television, were discussed in Congress, and were analyzed in
published administrative and judicial opinions."196
The Second Circuit has cautioned that the "truth-on-the-market defense is
intensely fact-specific and is rarely an appropriate basis for dismissing a § 10(b)
complaint for failure to plead materiality."197 I expected the technique to appear
exceedingly rarely.
Eighth, courts routinely assume that disclosures are not misleading simply
because they do not explain the economic, financial, and legal consequences of the
information actually disclosed.198 In the Second Circuit at least, the "understand
consequences" technique is best expressed by the axiom that "corporations ‘are not
required to address their stockholders as if they were children in kindergarten.’"199
Courts presume that reasonable investors are able, in essence, to add 2 + 2: given these
preconditions, 4 is not a material fact to be disclosed. 200 In the financial context, adding
2 + 2 is analogous to the following types of skills, among others:201

196

Seibert v. Sperry Rand Corp., 586 F.2d 949, 952 (2d Cir. 1978) ("A party's reasonable belief that the other party
already has access to the facts should excuse him from new disclosures which reasonably appear to be repetitive . . .
. We agree with the district court that reasonable minds could not differ as to the immateriality of the omissions.")
(internal citations and quotations omitted.)
197
Ganino, 228 F.3d at 167.
198
This technique, which I identified from the caselaw, inverts the "buried facts doctrine." Under that
doctrine a filing may be deemed materially misleading, despite having disclosed all material information, if
the information is not properly highlighted. See, e.g., Gould v. Am. -Haw. Steam. Co., 535 F.2d 761 (3d
Cir. 1976); Smallwood v. Pearl Brew. Co., 489 F.2d 579, 603 (5th Cir. 1974).
199
Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538, 554 (S.D.N.Y.1967).
200
Beaumont v. Am. Can Co., 621 F. Supp. 484, 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
201
Other examples include:
• Understanding the idea of opportunity costs of real estate investments. Kahn v. Wien, 842 F. Supp. 667,
675-76 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
• Understanding the nature and scope of interest necessary for a change in corporate control. Samjens
Partners I v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 614, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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•

Understanding that if both "variable annuities and tax qualified retirement

plans are tax deferrable," disclosing that using variable annuities for tax reasons is not
necessary.202
•

Understanding that shares may be valued using different methodologies and

appreciating the differences based on relevant underlying facts.203
•

Understanding that corporate managers are self-interested and wish to retain

control.204
•

Understanding basic accounting treatment.205

I had no expectations about this technique before analyzing the data.
My analysis also coded for "obscure" decisions (for which I could not determine
why a finding of presumed immateriality had been made) and for an "other" category
(where I could determine why the court had found disclosures or omissions immaterial,
but the reason did not fit one of the eight named techniques).
Table 2 describes, for each of the technique, the total number of cases applying
the techniques, the percentage of cases applying the technique, and the percentage of
these cases finding any claim presumptively immaterial.

202

Donovan v. Am. Skandia Life Ass. Corp., No 02-9859, 2003 WL 21757260, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 31,
2003).
203
In re United Brands Co. Sec. Lit., No. 85-5445, 1988 WL 67413, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 1988).
204
Allyn Corp. v. Hartford Nat. Corp., No 81-912, 1982 WL 1301, at *24 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 1982).
205
Rubin v. Long Island Lighting Co., 576 F. Supp. 608, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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Table 2: Presumed Immateriality Techniques

Understand
Consequences
Trivial
Other
Bespeaks Caution
Truth on the
Market
Puffery
Failure to Read
Fraud by
Hindsight
Obscure
Zero Price
Change

c.

Total Cases
Featuring
Technique
56

Percentage of
Total Cases

Prevalence in Cases Finding
206
Presumed Immateriality

17.4%

34.1%

54
35
34
24

16.8%
10.9%
10.6%
7.5%

32.9%
21.3%
20.7%
14.6%

23
18
15

7.1%
5.6%
4.7%

14.0%
11.0%
9.2%

13
6

4.0%
1.9%

7.9%
3.7%

Statistical Analysis of Techniques

For the five most common of the named techniques (ignoring the "other"
category) I performed two additional tests, asking: first, if the prevalence of the technique
as a means to finding presumed immateriality changed over time; and second, if the
techniques were positively correlated with others (i.e., were there particularly common
pairings of techniques).
(1)

Effect of Time

Figure 4 shows the effect of time on the techniques of understand consequences,
triviality, bespeaks caution, truth on the market, and puffery. It compares the relative use
of these five techniques to find a disclosure presumptive immaterial:

206

Because multiple techniques could be present in each case, some percentages will exceed 100%

49

Duty To Be Rational

Figure 4: Five Common Presumed Immateriality Techniques Over Time
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Figure 4 suggests that two techniques are growing over time (puffery and
bespeaks caution) and two are shrinking (triviality and understand consequences) while
one (truth on the market) has remained relatively constant. That is, while before 1980,
courts applied puffery in only 2% of all cases, in the last five years they did so 12.5% of
the time. I replicate Figure 4 in the margin in tabular form.207
As presumed immateriality as a whole is not itself changing (at least in a
statistically significant way) over time, this effect is relative. Puffery and bespeaks
caution are taking "market share" from triviality and understanding consequences. But,
207

In the following chart, the numbers represent the percentage of total private plaintiff cases (322 total
cases) in which the technique appears as a reason supporting a finding of presumed immateriality.
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of these five common techniques, only the growth in the bespeaks caution and puffery
doctrines is statistically significant.208
(2)

Correlation Between Immateriality Techniques.

Next, I tested for the correlation between techniques. Table 3
displays the results of a statistical test asking the following question: if a court uses a
given presumed immateriality technique, are any other techniques also likely to appear
(or not to appear).209 This is a correlation coefficient test, and, on Table 3, Y denotes
positively correlated210 and YY denotes strongly positively correlated techniques;211 N
denotes negatively correlated, and NN denotes strongly negatively correlated techniques.
Table 3: Correlation between Presumed Immateriality Coefficients
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---
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Y
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YY
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Y

PUFF
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As Table 3 shows, the only technique correlating positively or negatively with
other techniques is the bespeaks caution doctrine.

208

In a one-way analysis of variance of each variable against time. Bespeaks caution: P<.001;
Puffery<.05.
209
See generally BARNES, supra n. 141, at 265 (describing correlation coefficients).
210
At a .05 level.
211
At a .01 level.
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Courts applying the bespeaks caution doctrine to a given set of disclosures are
also very likely to use the techniques of puffery and investors’ failure to read, and
somewhat likely to apply the truth on the market technique. One way to explain this data
is that these three techniques apply to similar sorts of claims – courts seeking to dismiss
allegations turn to the same analytical toolbox and bring out three similarly useful tools.
On the other hand, courts applying bespeaks caution are less likely to use the
triviality and understand consequences techniques at the same time. The negative
correlation between bespeaks caution and the triviality and understanding consequences
techniques, together with the growth in the bespeaks caution technique itself, supports the
theory that bespeaks caution increasingly has replaced those doctrines in the arsenal of
courts seeking to find a way to dismiss claims as immaterial.
Part III:

BLE and the Presumed Immateriality Techniques

As Part II demonstrated, findings of presumed immateriality have been common
and stable over the last thirty years. Since 1976, surveyed courts considering the
materiality standard have found at least one claim per case immaterial 44% of the time,
while those courts considering the standard in private actions dismiss claims as
immaterial 51% of the time. Presumed immateriality thus creates a commonly reoccurring problem for courts: to articulate and defend theories of investor behavior that
justify dismissal of securities lawsuits. The aggregate result of courts' attempt to solve
this problem are surprising.
First, the materiality standard’s diverse effect on private and public plaintiffs
suggests that materiality functions to limit securities fraud recoveries to certain kinds of
private investors (i.e., ones that do not rely on information courts presume is immaterial).
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Because plaintiff identity predicts the doctrine more than any other tested variable212 we
may infer that presumed immateriality's primary role is to change the behavior of
ordinary investors.213
Some differences in private and public success rates in securities cases may be
explained by better "screening" of the kinds of cases the government brings,214 and better
lawyering throughout the process.215 But for this claim to explain all of the differences I
observed in government and civil success rates, we would have to assume that civil
plaintiffs benefit by bringing claims that fail around half the time. This claim, in turn
relies on a presumption about civil lawyers’ beliefs in the "docket management"
hypothesis: a certain number of claims are cut from each complaint at each stage in
litigation,216 and therefore a case should contain more than merely meritorious claims.217
Whether this hypothesis is plausible given the securities acts’ sanctions regime (imposed
on frivolous claims), I found no evidence in the bar literature that civil lawyers actually
believe they need to bring cases overstuffed with claims.218
Another variant on this screening claim is to assume that because government
212

See infra at Part II.1.c. (regression of variables). I have not tested for the effect of defendant size nor did
I test for the effect of defendant form (individual, partnership or corporation).
213
Unless there was a claim that civil suits are significantly stronger medicine than government initiated
actions. The empirics of such a claim are complicated, and worth exploring in another forum.
214
Government lawyers must acquire permission at multiple bureaucratic levels before instituting a suit, and select
which cases to litigate based on many factors, including: (1) potential public impact; (2) precendential value; (3)
consistency with previous litigation positions; and (4) need to set standards of generally applicable behavior.
215
Cf. Matthew C. Stephenson, Mixed Signals: Reconsidering the Political Economy of Judicial Deference
to Administrative Agencies, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 675 (2004) (discussing the practice of judicial deference to
agencies); Michael Herz & Neal Devins, Recent Developments in Federal Agency Focus: the Department
of Justice: The Consequences of DOJ Control of Litigation on Agencies' Programs, 52 ADMIN. L. REV.
1345, 1346 (2000) ("DOJ's status is justified on the grounds that a single, highly talented 'law firm' will
ensure quality representation, consistency, efficiency....").
216
See infra at text accompanying notes 222 through 226.
217
As Krawiec & Zeiler observe, where plaintiffs intermingle a few strong claims with a number of weaker claims
based on the same fact pattern (as in most securities fraud cases) "the marginal cost of adding an additional weak
claim to the suit is essentially zero." Krawiec & Zeiler, supra n. n. 5, at 87.
218
But cf. Michael D. Finnegan, Survey: Consumer Financial Services, 41 BUS. LAW. 997 (1986)
("Tactically, overpleading is extraordinarily useful to the plaintiff in the demurrer context in California.").
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litigation is so deadly for corporations, only particularly bad actors with self-dealing
boards allow cases to proceed to any decision on the merits. This argument is plausible
given that many SEC investigations are settled before filing of a complaint. But, there
was no statistical difference in presumed immateriality determinations based on
procedural posture,219 so this theory lacks strongsupport as well .
To code for a finding of presumed immateriality, I asked ifany claim was
presumptively immaterial. The government’s ability to pass this extremely high bar 93%
of the time is remarkable. No structural explanation alone explains the enormous gap
between government success and private plaintiff failure on the materiality issue. Rather,
the difference is likely due to a combination of the above factors with: (1) judicial
deference to the SEC and the United States in their roles as securities" cops"; and (2) lack
of deference to private plaintiffs, who are seen to be under the control of counsel (filing
"strike suits" for easy settlements).
Second, while courts should be less likely to find claims immaterial earlier in
lawsuits, the reverse is true, and procedure generally has no significant impact on
presumed immateriality findings. Neither have judges’ applications of the doctrine been
statistically different over time, even though the personnel and ideology of the federal
courts has allegedly shifted toward judges hostile to securities law claims.220
These results strongly suggest that something strange is going on with the
presumed immateriality doctrine. It cannot be, as courts assert, that presumed
immateriality is simply a way to govern corporate activity levels (as courts assert): 221 if it

219

The same set of government cases is too small to separate out such plaintiffs for a distinct examination.
See Langevoort, supra n. 5, at 316-18; see also infra at n. 253 (analysis of appointments of judges in the
data set).
221
See supra text accompanying note 121.
220

54

Duty To Be Rational
were, civil and public litigants would achieve similar successes. Nor are courts merely
protecting investors from the perils of overdisclosure. What is really happening?
As some have argued,222 presumed immateriality may be a docket pruning
technique. As we have seen, courts are pruning a relatively stable percentage of
securities fraud cases from their dockets at every procedural stage in a lawsuit.223 In this
model, presumed immateriality permits courts to slash 40-60% of issues from a lawsuit at
every opportunity.224
This docket pruning hypothesis is unsatisfactory on two levels. Most damaging is
presumed immateriality’s stability over time. In the last thirty years, there have been
significant shifts in how federal courts perceive their role: mechanisms for docket
management have become more favored, and summary judgment in particular has gained
in legitimacy as a judicial tool.225 Moreover, private party securities suits themselves
have cycled in political popularity, from a nadir in the early-1990s (leading to the PSLRA
in 1995), to the highs following the collapse of Enron and the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley.
But presumed immateriality is insensitive to time; it has neither grown nor shifted in a
way we can attributable to factors other than chance. This finding seriously undermines
the explanatory power of the docket pruning hypothesis.
Even if it did not, docket pruning assumes the methods of presumed immateriality
222

See generally Bainbridge and Gulati, supra n. 5.
Although, in practical effect, courts are pruning at a higher rate at later procedural stages. See supra n.
144.
224
In one sense, this docket pruning model is related to a model of litigation that assumes only close cases are
brought to litigation (others being settled before suit) and therefore "the formal structure of the law [will] appear
indeterminate to any scientific, empirical method of observing judicial decisions." George L. Priest and Benjamin
Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEG. STUD. 1, 6 (1984), cited in Krawiec & Zeiler, supra n. n.
5, at 85-86. I, like Krawiec and Zeiler, conclude that there is reason to doubt the predictive value of this theory in
the context of analyzing one element in a larger claim. Id. at 87.
225
See generally Martin B. Louis, Intercepting and Discouraging Doubtful Litigation, A Golden
Anniversary View of Pleading, Summary Judgment, and Rule 11 Sanctions Under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1023 (1989).
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are not significant. But, if the reasons for presumed immateriality decisions have
undergone a noticeable shift over time, such shifting rationales would suggest a degree of
intellectual coherence (at any given moment in time) the docket pruning model
eschews.226 To make sense of presumed immateriality, then, we need to consider why
courts say they are finding claims presumptively immaterial. As discussed above, puffery
and bespeaks caution appear to be displacing understand consequences and triviality as
the most common reasons court cite to find claims immaterial. To determine if this
change is consequential, we can now analyze each of these doctrines from a BLE
perspective.
1.

Puffery and Bespeaks Caution: Investor States of Mind

When disclosures or omissions are found to be immaterial based on the puffery
doctrine, courts make an assumption about investor reaction to disclosure: reasonable
investors do not invest capital based on optimism, but instead based on facts. Is this true?
No. Under many circumstances, BLE would predict the reverse.227 The puffery
doctrine ignores the powerful effects of loss aversion; investors whose stock has lost
value are risk seeking (and more likely to act on positive disclosures with weak
informational content).228 Similarly, puffery ignores the perversion of rationality that
accompanies our powerful overoptimism bias: when a corporation states that market
conditions are "likely to improve," and we already own some of its stock, we are likely to
think to ourselves: "of course my stock will do better than average."229 Arguing that
226

This is not to say that the two models are mutually exclusive. Judges may be using presumed
immateriality techniques to prune their dockets even as they impose a model of investor behavior.
227
Bainbridge and Gulati, supra n. 5, at 120 ("Anecdotally, it does not take much time watching investment
programs on television to notice that even vague statements of optimism by corporate managers are
considered important by the investment news media.")
228
See supra text accompanying notes 65 through 69.
229
See supra text accompanying notes 73 through 80.
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puffing statements will not be relied on also ignores possible endowment effects,
experiential thinking,230 information overload,231 source blindness, and herd behavior.232
Use of the bespeaks caution technique also contradicts BLE insights. Not
surprisingly, only rarely did courtsapply the bespeaks caution doctrine based on an
empirical analysis of whether shareholders actually reacted to disclosures which were
subject to cautions.233 Thus, courts’ increased use of the doctrine represents a mere
assumption that cautionary statements obviate the reasonableness of reliance by
reasonable investors on earlier forecasts (either positive or negative).
Not only do individuals have the problems of risk processing (discussed above
respecting puffery), endowment, experiential thinking, and information overload, they are
also unable to make (as courts applying the bespeaks caution doctrine require them) the
subtle adjustment with respect to informational source. Courts assume that individuals
can hear a source saying two things: "I express the following beliefs about the future";
and "Don’t rely on anything I just said," and make a rational decision about which of
those statements is worthy of credence. This is nonsense.
Puffery and bespeaks caution are alike in another way: they attempt to create
bright line rules to differentiate reasonable from unreasonable reliance. Both doctrines
are easy to apply (they require merely the presence or absence of certain magic words),
230

To the extent that our assessment of risk is colored by our emotional assessment of the target, generally
positive statements may drape the investment with a penumbra of positive feeling, leading us to discount
later specific information to the contrary. See supra text accompanying notes 81 through 88.
231
For investors confronted with a large disclosure, early puffery (such as, "our business model remains
strong") may be incorporated into the investing decision, while later financial disclosures in dense
footnotes would be ignored. I would provide a citation from a case here, but I sense the reader might be
overwhelmed by the detail.
232
When puffery is in a press release or made through a corporate spokesman, it seems likely that investors
will respond to social cues and trust the corporate manager's clear statements of vague optimism, especially
if others in the market do so.
233
Cf. Bainbridge and Gulati, supra n. 5, at 123 (criticizing courts for ignoring context when analyzing
statements allegedly protected by the bespeaks caution doctrine).
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and easy to create from the perspective of the disclosing entity. That is, disclosing
entities can shelter information from fraud by making it part of optimistic predictions or
pairing it with cautions. Notably, both doctrines create incentives for corporations to use
words that they hope will induce reliance, but which are legally irrelevant: they are bright
line rules that enable fraud.
2.

Understand Consequences and Triviality

Let us compare puffery and bespeaks caution with their common predecessors:
understanding consequences and triviality. Both of these techniques are focused on the
nature of the disclosure (and not on magic words). For understanding consequences,
courts focused on the underlying facts disclosed, not the language of the offering
document, and the relationship between those facts and either (a) the real world; or (b) a
hypothesized skill-set investors deemed to possess.
Neither of these techniques is without flaws. The consequences doctrine supports
Langevoort’s view that judges in securities cases are subject to "lawyers’ biases,"234
which make them overconfident with respect to their ability to understand how the world
"really works," complete with a sneer toward "laypeople" who do not understand the
game.235 Empathy for investor incompetence is hard for judges who always analyze
disclosures in hindsight armed with briefs which explain financial, accounting, and legal

234

Langevoort, supra n. 5, at 318.
I am reminded of Duncan Kennedy's criticism of legal education, in which he argued:
The final hierarchy that concerns us is the general social arrangement in which lawyers are treated
. . . as among the elite of the nation. Partly this is simply a reflection of the fact that many lawyers
come from the upper middle class to start with . . . . At each level of the class system, lawyers are
granted a measure of power altogether disproportionate to their objective merit. In their group
activities, but also in their individual social lives, they tend to exploit this deference and to
accentuate it by emphasizing the arcane character of what they know and do.
DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY: A POLEMIC AGAINST
THE SYSTEM 57 (NYU 2004).
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concepts in concise, readable ways.236 Moreover, courts regularly assume individuals
will be able to rationally understand the likelihood of potential future gains, or unlikely
future legal problems, despite humans’ inability to rationally calculate the effect of
unlikely, but catastrophic, events.
The triviality doctrine also contrasts with evidence from BLE. It boils down to an
intuition that "trivial bits of information do not play a role in the investment decisions of
reasonable investors because they relate to a small aspect of the business."237 But, as
BLE teaches, investors are poor at making this type of comparison.
Ultimately, the shift I have noted is a shift between a standard-based model of
materiality and a model based on bright line rules, in which courts spend less time
considering the actual potential effects of the disclosure, and more time applying a
mechanistic set of rules ("If cautioned, then immaterial") to the words of the disclosure
itself. This is a troublesome development, for reasons discuss ed in Part IV.
3.

Other Doctrines

Although the four techniques we have just discussed are the "headlines" of my
results, it is worth thinking briefly about the relationship between the other doctrines in
the arsenals of courts and BLE. As we will see, each of the remaining four classic
techniques relies on assumptions about human behavior which are sometimes, if not
always, untrue.
a. Zero Price Change
The zero price change doctrine relies on the same assumption of market efficiency

236

Sometimes. Lawyers' briefs are more likely to clearly explain a disclosure than a corporation's 10-K
statement.
237
Bainbridge and Gulati, supra n. 5, at 125.
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that permits securities claims to proceed without proof of actual reliance.238 That is,
courts assume that markets will react to any price relevant information. 239
This intuition is the same as that which would conclude that framing effects
ought to have no relationship to outcomes; that saving two of six people is the same as
killing four out of six. Failure to react to information may be a result of BLE heuristics
and biases, instead of anything internal to the importance of the disclosure itself.
It may be interesting to consider zero price change in the context of the Sherlock
Holmes story of the dog that did not bark in the nighttime.240 While Holmes concluded
that silence is necessarily consequential, the empirics of this claim are dubious.241
Indeed, use of non-market impact to establish materiality at the time of the investing
decision is a decision infected with hindsight bias (although such impact would be
ameliorated if courts allowed evidence of actual market effects to mean materiality as a
matter of law).
Courts appear reluctant to apply the zero price change technique: in less than four
percent of cases finding any claim presumptively immaterial did they do so. However,
my sense of the caselaw is that defendants make "zero price change" arguments often. It
is interesting, and worth further study, to think about why courts are able to resist the
238

See Bainbridge and Gulati, supra n. 5, at 123-24.
Of course, markets may be rational even when individual participants are not. See, e.g., Hilton, supra n.
79, at 273 (discussing political futures markets).
240
"'Is there any point to which you would wish to draw my attention?'
'To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time.'
'The dog did nothing in the night-time.'
'That was the curious incident,' remarked Sherlock Holmes."
Arthur Conan Doyle, Silver Blaze, in MEMOIRS OF SHERLOCK HOLMES (1901), available at
http://etext.library.adelaide.edu.au/d/doyle/arthur_conan/d75me/silver.blaze.html.
241
Intuitions about the importance of silence are common in the legal academy, especially when thinking
about statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Michael D. Shumsky, Severability, Inserverability, and the Rule of
Law, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 227, 270,n.207 (2004). I have not seen a theoretical, unified approach to
silence (by legislatures, courts, individuals, etc.) For the beginning of such a work, see Daniel M. Filler,
Silence and the Racial Dimension of Megan's Law, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1535, 1576-94 (2004) (discussing
causes and remedies for silence in discussing race with respect to community notification laws).
239
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conclusion that market silence should speak loudly.
b. Fraud by Hindsight
Fraud by hindsight appears to be a direct application of the doctrine of presumed
immateriality to correct for a bias (hindsight) which results in an inappropriate finding of
materiality.242 Only a small number of securities cases apply the doctrine (exclusively) to
materiality rather than scienter determinations,243 although around ten percent of cases
finding a claim immaterial cited fraud by hindsight as one of the reasons supporting their
decision.
c. Failure to Read
Courts’ criticism
s of investors who fail to read a large universe of information,
and who rely on oral, rather than written, materials, is understandable. The failure to read
doctrine serves the same ends as most formalities.244 Courts concerned about the
prevalence of securities suits do well to insist on the primacy of written material. Thus,
the failure to read technique acts as a common law statute of frauds in securities cases.
The technique has grown in scope over time, but the growth is not statistically
significant.245 Even today, courts apply the failure to read technique rarely. When they
do so, they also commonly apply the bespeaks caution doctrine. This correlation
suggests a kind of "analytical toolbox" for the problem of fraud alleged to have occurred
through misleading, inconsistent disclosure.
d. Truth on the Market
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Rachlinski, supra n. 53, at 108.
See also Gulatiet al ., supra n. 23, at 807.
244
See generally Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941) (consideration,
channeling and evidentiary functions).
245
The results might be different in a jurisdiction like the Seventh Circuit that endorses the Carr v. Cigna
doctrine.
243
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The truth on the market technique imposes search costs on investors, and ignores
evidence that more information may not improve the quality of investing decisions. For
courts applying this technique, the idea that an omission cannot be material if it replicates
publicly available information makes a great deal of sense. Nevertheless, increased use
of this technique makes investors responsible for understanding and processing a
bewildering array of information. Whether allinvestors are equally capable of making
this kind of search and analysis is questionable.
Nonetheless, the truth on the market technique is relatively prevalent, appearing
in 7.5% of the total dataset, and in 14.6% of cases finding any claim immaterial.
In Table 4, I summarize the preceding discussion by connecting each of the eight
named techniques with the BLE observations that the technique potentially ignores:

Table 4: Relationship of BLE to Presumed Immateriality
Doctrinal Technique

14

20.7

62

9.2

3.7

32.9

11

34.1

Truth on the
Market

Understand
Consequences

Failure to Read

Trivial Matters

Zero Price
Change

Fraud by
Hindsight

Bespeaks
Caution

Puffery

BLE Experimental Observation

Trouble with Probability
X
Hindsight Bias
X
X
X
X
Representativeness Heuristic
X
X
X
X
X
Risk Seeking (Mitigate Current Losses)
X
X
X
X
Risk Aversion (Gains)
X
X
X
X
X
Endowment Effect
X
X
X
X
X
Overconfidence
X
X
X
X
X
X
Experiential Thinking
Information Processing
X
X
X
X
Source Blindness
X
X
X
Overweighing Oral Disclosures
X
X
X
X
Framing Effect
X
X
X
X
X
X
Information Overload
Social Investing
X
X
X
X
X
X
Herd Behavior
Percentage of Cases Finding Presumed Immateriality That Applied Technique (Average)

X
X
X
X
X
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In considering the implications of the results displayed in Table 4, we can see that all of
the techniques, to one degree or another, make assumptions about behavior which are
fundamentally in tension with how BLE predicts investors will sometimes behave. We also see
that puffery, for example, is a doctrine that most obviously affects individuals’ trouble with
probabilistic assessments, while the failure to read heuristic is primarily in tension with
individuals’ inabilities to process information rationally. The relationship between BLE’s
insights and courts’ blindness to how investors behave gives rise to the "duty to be a rational
shareholder."
IV.

The "Duty" to Be a Rational Shareholder
The shift in the rationale for findings of presumed immateriality over time from

standards-based to bright-line based reasoning suggests that materiality is evolving
toward a formal rule: behave in a certain way, or suffer the consequences. Courts
applying a standards-based model (represented by the trivial matters and understanding
consequences doctrines), provide little guidance for investors to know before injury if
they were reacting to material or immaterial information. Under the puffery and
bespeaks caution doctrines, by contrast, allinvestors should be able to anticipate legal
rules and conform their conduct accordingly. If investors fail to comply with the bright
line rules of the doctrine, they will not recover damages despite relying on disclosures or
omissions that were fraudulent.
One way to understand the federal disclosure and liability regime is as a
federally mandated and defined insurance against securities fraud,246 conditioned on a
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Cf. David Tabak, Loss Causation and Damages in Shareholder Class Actions: When it Takes Two Steps
to Tango, 1442 PLI/CORP 181, 195 (2004) (protection offered by securities laws exceeding expected yields
absent the law "makes the securities fraud laws a form of insurance"). To be clear, this is just a metaphor:
investors do not pay a special form of premium to obtain the protection of the securities laws. Although we
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finding of materiality.247 This benefit is generally available to all investors in federally
registered securities, and "pays out" if and when an investor has been harmed by fraud
and files suit. There are then two narratives explaining how the law distributes this
benefit:
1.

To get the benefit of securities insurance, you should invest
rationally in response to disclosure; or

2.

All investors will receive the benefit of securities insurance, unless
they act irrationally in response to disclosure.

The second formulation, which suggests a punishment for failure to comply with a
generally applicable standard, better captures the caselaw’s evolving emphasis on the
undesirability of protecting irrational investors and the increased emphasis on bright-line,
enforceable rules. This narrative also has an important connotation: we should see
presumed immateriality as an attempt by courts to shape the ordinary relationship
between corporations and investors, not merely the contours of recovery in litigation.
That is, we should see presumed immateriality as a way of creating a legal duty to be a
rational shareholder.248

might consider federal income taxes to be a kind of premium, that argument would seem to prove too
much.
247
William S. Feinstein, Note, Securities Fraud: Pleading Fraud with Particularity-Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b) in the Rule 10b-5 Context: Koval v. M.C.I. Communications Corp., 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
851, 855 n.32 (1996) (securities fraud is not a form of insurance because of materiality limitations, among
others). To state that securities fraud recovery provides a form of insurance to investors is not to claim that
the insurance is the same as, say, as car insurance. However, all insurance excludes certain kinds of
injuries (i.e. drunk driving) and privileges certain behaviors (i.e., a certain number of accident free years) or
demographics (i.e., insurance is more expensive the very young and very old). See generally Robert H.
Jerry II & Kyle Mansfield, Justifying Unisex Insurance, Another Perspective, 34 AM. U.L. REV. 329 (1985)
("Insurers will continue to classify insured persons into distinct groups as long as the cost of measuring the
differentiating factor is less than the premium reduction the insurer can offer the members of a
differentiated, better-risk group. ...").
248
Some will object that it is never appropriate to refer to a defense in litigation – a bar to liability or damages – as a
legal "duty." Such skepticism toward "duty talk" is prominent in analogous defenses like the "duty to mitigate"
contract and tort damages, the "duty to preserve evidence," and the duty to be non-negligent (in comparative
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Presumed immateriality judges investor behavior before injury (that is, change in
share price) has occurred: every individual buying stock risks losing the benefit of
securities insurance if she is not "rational."249 As a result, the presumed immateriality
affects all investors in the capital markets. It conditions the availability of a legal benefit
on compliance with a generally applicable standard of conduct, imposing on shareholders
onerous affirmative – and conduct shaping – expectations.250
It is worth reiterating why judges seem drawn to rationality as a way to choose
between reasonable and unreasonable investors. As alluded to earlier in this paper, there
are three competing theories that explain the evolution of materiality in the securities law.
The first two are essentially based on BLE insights, and the third is ideological:
•

First, judges may be using these techniques as a quick and easy way (a
cognitively limited way) to get rid of (boring) cases that they do not
particularly want to spend time on.251 We can think of this as the "lazy
judges" hypothesis.

negligence states). See, e.g., Howard C. Eglit, Damages Mitigation Doctrine in the Statutory Anti-Discrimination
Context: Mitigating Its Negative Impact, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 9, n.3 (2000) ("failure to mitigate does not expose the
failing party to any liability, as would the failure to satisfy a duty"); Roy Ryden Anderson, Incidental and
Consequential Damages, 7 J.L. & COM. 327, 376 (1987) ("duty to mitigate is a "misnomer, because the aggrieved
party incurs no actual liability for his failure to mitigate"); Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of
Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1184 (1970) (criticizing application of the term "duty" to the duty to mitigate
contract damages). Even though these duties may give rise to important affirmative obligations they arise after the
cause of action has accrued. Charles J. Goetz and Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General
Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 974 (1983). Similarly, the duty to preserve evidence at trial
arises after a party has notice of the possibility of a suit. See Townsend v. Am. Insul. Panel Co., 174 F.R.D. 1, 13-14
(D. Mass. 1997).
249
In this way, it is distinct from "false duties" like the duty to mitigate. See id.
250
For those who have difficulty imagining how impairment of rights in litigation may be conceived as
duty at all, my colleague, Craig Green, suggests that we imagine that the Federal Government has created a
program that distributes benefits to foster parents. The Government imposes certain conditions on the
receipt of funds (i.e., keeping the home in a certain condition, maintaining a stable home, making the home
available for inspection); failure to observe the conditions will lead to a denial of funds. It seems relatively
uncontroversial to imagine these conditions as "duties" imposed by the federal government on foster
parents. However, they are likely to be enforced only when a foster parent is denied the benefits, and sues,
at which time the government will assert that the parent has failed his duty, and is not entitled to benefits.
251
See Bainbridge and Gulati, supra n. 5, at 111-13.

65

Duty To Be Rational
•

Second, judges may be presuming immateriality because they are subject
to "lawyer’s biases" that render them overconfident in their abilities to
themselves avoid the biases affecting investors.252 We can think of this as
an "arrogant judges" hypothesis.

•

Third, judges may be reflecting and encouraging a general "prodefendant" bias resulting from a shift in the personnel on the federal
courts.253 We can think of this final theory as the "conservative judges"
hypothesis.

The evidence I collected does not support the "conservative" hypothesis, as
presumed immateriality has not grown noticeably in scope over time, nor has it shifted
with changes in the securities laws.254 My evidence also undermines both behavioral
explanations. The "lazy" and "arrogant" stories of judicial behavior fail to account for the
shift from standards-based to bright-line rules of decision.
I therefore offer a fourth explanation for the presumed immateriality doctrine:
courts analyze investors’ claims of reasonableness based on a model of behavior they
import from their experiences with corporate law. For courts, public shareholders ought
to act like all other participants in the corporate governance system: motivated by an
easily comprehendible set of monetary incentives, and subject to a clear set of bright lines
252

Langevoort, supra n. 5, at 314-16.
Id. at 316-18. While that trend my be apparent nationwide, the composition of the judges of the Second Circuit
and its district courts has remained relatively stable. In 1976, of 66 judges sitting on the courts that made up my
sample, 39 (or 59%) were appointed by Republican Presidents. In 2004, of 110 judges, 63 (or 57%) were appointed
by Republican Presidents. See Federal Judicial Center, Search Engine, available at
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf (last visited Feb. 22, 2005).
254
Another perspective on the stability of the doctrine would begin by positing that cases filed have actually gotten
stronger (or, better pled) over time, and that, therefore, the lack of change in findings of presumed immateriality
does reflect a negative change in judicial ideology. This claim would probably turn on an analysis of the effects of
the PSLRA on pleading practice post-1995 (i.e., with law firm consolidation post-1995, pleadings got better), and
would not explain stability before that date. It is difficult, in reading the caselaw, to develop a way to measure the
objective strength of a lawsuit apart from its court ordered disposition. See also supra n. 137 (discussing a variant
on the "strength of lawsuit" hypothesis).
253
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to ensure the smooth functioning of the corporate form. 255 Indeed, rational public
shareholders are the foundation of the corporate governance system: take them away, and
the entire edifice may crumble. As judges have become more aware of human
irrationality – through increased awareness of BLE and increased publicity about
challenges to the efficient capital market hypothesis – perhaps they have reacted strongly
to protect the model of human rationality. Thus, courts are comfortable imposing a duty
to be rational, thereby requiring investors in the securities context to behave like other
actors in the corporate governance model.
But, in doing so courts put the securities laws in tension with the fundamental
principle of corporate governance introducing this paper: shareholders owe no duties.
That is, courts seeking to harmonize securities and corporate law may have put the two
systems in conflict with each other. Which will give?
Before engaging in what might become a very large thought project, we should
consider how we might measure the actual, real world effects of the duty that this article
has uncovered.
1.

The Duty to Be Rational: Some Empirical Predictions

255

Corporate law generally assumes and provides incentives for shareholder profit maximizing behavior.
Greenfield, supra n. 2, at 646-6 (noting examples).
The ultimatum game, a well-known BLE experiment, provides a different perspective on this result. An
experiment provides one of two people (the "chooser") a pot of money. The chooser must decide on an
allocation between himself and another individual (the "accepting party"). The chooser may describe any
allocation he wishes; the accepting party may only accept or refuse the bargain. In the absence of
acceptance, neither party takes any money. See generally Greenfield and Kostand, supra n. 38, at 988-92
(discussing variants of the ultimatum game and its application in legal scholarship). Economic theory
predicts the accepting party will accept any non-zero proposal. However, it is quite common for the
accepting party to reject offers of less than twenty percent of the total available. And, surprisingly, the
choosing party usually offers between forty and fifty percent of the total.
In a related experimental series, BLE practitioners analyzed individuals' reactions to corporate cost benefit
analysis ("CBA"). In CBA, corporations decide between alternatives by applying the profit maximization
norm to the costs and benefits of action and inaction. A robust body of literature suggests that individuals
dislike CBA, especially when the decision involves possible loss of human life. This result holds even
when experimental subjects understand the benefits of efficiency and profit maximization. See generally
David A. Hoffman, Review Essay, How Relevant is Jury Rationality? 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 507, 524-25.
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Usually, enforcement of duties depends on the understanding that "ought implies
can."256 But, it is very hard for individual shareholders to react rationally in response to
information. Many of the deviations from the model of rationality endorsed by the duty
are unconscious products of the ways our brain is wired to make decisions.257 Individuals
can no more control the way they react to risk, the argument would go, than they can stop
themselves from hiccupping, from feeling an adrenaline rush in face of danger, or from
feeling love for a child.
It is because irrationality is somewhat fixed that the effects of this duty I would
otherwise describe – that it has a positive effect on real world behavior – must fail. Even
though the duty to be rational is increasingly specific and publicized, it would be very
surprising if in the years post-TSC Industries there was less real-world price movement in
reaction to disclosures that the law excludes as nonactionable. Such a correlation would
be evidence that the duty was effective, and that individuals had been able to somehow
modify their behaviors so as to regain the protection of securities insurance.
Some – relying on the understanding consequences technique – would conclude
that while full rationality (i.e. risk processing rationality) is unlikely, investors are
generally intelligent and able to process the idea of the rationality duty. Picture a
somewhat ambitious investor, conscious of her limitations, but intelligent enough to want
to do something about them. The best solution for her is to invest in mutual funds.
Mutual funds and other institutional investors are probably less likely to behave
irrationally in response to disclosure, are more likely to have lawyers and economists on
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John Hasnas, Equal Opportunity, Affirmative Action, and the Anti-Discrimination Principle: The Full
Philosophical Basis for the Legal Prohibition of Discrimination, 71 FORD. L. REV. 423, 506 (2002) (citing
IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 307-08 (J.M.D. Meiklejohn trans., 1990) (1787)).
257
See supra text accompanying notes 48 through 50.
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staff to understand "prospectus-speak," will know and have recorded all price relevant
market information, and will be less likely to be swayed into following herds into
investments.258 Approximately 1/3 of holdings in the U.S. stock market today are
institutional (having grown from a quarter thirty years ago).259 Informed investors should
join this tide and commit themselves to a course of rationality before making a potentially
harmful decision.260
Thus, as investors learn of the duties imposed by presumed immateriality
doctrine, I predict that mutual funds should experience higher than expected capital
infusions. This will be especially true in years after particularly important growths in one
of the duty’s constituent techniques (for example, the bespeaks caution doctrine’s arrival
in the mid-1980s).
Coincident with the effects of presumed immateriality on shareholders, we should
also see effects on corporations. As businesses realize the protections which the doctrine
offers them, they should feel more secure in making certain kinds of disclosures. Thus, I
predict that corporations should increasingly seek to shelter disclosure by coupling
financial predictions with cautionary statements and encouraging investment by making
proportionately more statements of corporate optimism.
Now, we must complicate the analysis which had previously assumed that all
investors are alike. Some BLE researchers seek to demonstrate how "rationality" is a
cultural construction that is more likely to appeal to white men than other demographic
258

Institutional investors have "extensive trading expertise" and "actively seek information about new issues
as well as current holdings." See Ryan, supra n. 26, at 149.
259
Id. at 147.
260
We may analogize these kind of decisions to a driver who, knowing that he is particularly likely to make
foolish turns at intersections, proceeds to rip the steering wheel from his car when he sees the intersection
approaching, and throws it out the window, and thereby committing himself to a straight course. The most
significant problem with such decision making is the presence of other committed drivers.
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groups. This literature is complex, and I can only offer a small taste of it here.261 Some
BLE researchers have attempted to document the ways in which sex, culture, and race
affect reactions to risk, uncertainty, and information. One basic and well-established
conclusion is that men and women perceive risk differently.262 Many studies have found
that on average, men are more comfortable with higher levels of risk (particularly
environmental risks) than women.263 Women thus exhibit higher rates of loss-aversion
than men in evaluating financial investments.264 Some have argued that this effect results
from women’s relative lack of socioeconomic power,265 others attribute differences to
biology.266
Class and race also play significantly into perceptions of risk.267 In the literature,
this is known as the "white male effect."268 As a group, white men are significantly less
likely to be concerned about higher levels of risk (even with respect to presently held
gains), and tolerate higher losses than minorities.269 This effect too is said to be related to
feelings of vulnerability and disempowerment: "because [minorities] benefit less from
many of [the world's] technologies and institutions, and because they have less power and
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control over what happens in their communities and their lives." 270
This discussion leads to a final prediction: shares of recoveries in securities class
actions (and settlements) will be distinct from the demographic characteristics of the all
participants in the capital markets.271 Women and minorities will recover at lower rates
than institutional investors, especially to the extent that materiality moves toward
doctrines that particularly disfavor experiential thinking.272
2.

The Duty to Be A Rational Shareholder: Some Corporate Law

Complications
The discussion so far has sought to provide metrics with which to evaluate the
practical effects of changes in judge-made securities doctrines on participants in the
capital markets. However, this doctrinal evolution should also cause corporate law
scholars to explore whether some well-accepted truths about corporate governance are
ripe for reevaluation. The following section begins this task by considering the irony that
presumed immateriality doctrine effectively increases government regulation of the
corporate form to serve a model of investor behavior (market-based, wealth-maximizing,
270
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rationality) that supposedly supports the edifice of privately ordered corporate law in the
first instance.
I began this article by emphasizing that a basic principle of corporate law is that
investors buy assets under a "no duty" default rule. This rule has three bases, the first
grounded in the basic framework of corporate law, the second in an intuition about the
relationship between law and markets, and the third based on enforcement concerns.
Understanding that the presumed immateriality standard has created a duty affecting all
investors requires us to think about how courts are undermining or changing each of these
foundational assumptions.
First, the law presumes investors are passive, delegating their control rights to the
board and management of the asset they are purchasing.273
Second, the law presumes that the best way to encourage economic growth is to
encourage market transactions in assets. Encumbering assets with duties may reduce the
value of such assets, discouraging transactions, and thus reducing the ability of markets
to generate capital for participating businesses.274
Third, the law imposes no duties on common investors because it is difficult to
imagine to whom such duties should run. Courts, regulating the corporate form,
generally reject the idea of (public) duties owed to individuals in society at large with
(merely) potential reliance interests.
The scope of presumed immateriality requires us to reconsider whether courts in
the securities context are adhering to these assumptions. In particular, courts seem to be
increasingly willing to apply a "public duty" to participants in the corporate enterprise.
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In our legal system, creating duties usually entails creating correlative rights.275
However, in some circumstances, new duties (such as the duty not to harm endangered
species) do not give rise to a right to a cause of action.276 We can conceptualize such
duties as essentially self-regarding, and enforceable, if at all, by society at large.277
Another way to think about this problem was suggested by John Austin, who thought of
duties as correlative not to rights, but to commands:
Being liable to evil from you if I comply not with a wish which you
signify, I am bound or obliged by your commands, or I lie under a duty to
obey it. If, in spite of that evil in prospect, I comply not with the wish
which you signify, I am said to disobey your command, or to violate the
duty which it imposes.278
Thus, we can think of the "duty to be a rational shareholder" as an obligation
enforced by the "evil" of a loss of the benefit of securities insurance. It is an obligation
which benefits society (or the market, or the corporation) but which runs to no one.
Thus, while ordinarily breach of a duty in the corporate context creates a right to
sue,279 the duty to be a rational shareholder creates merely a "right" to a defense in a
given securities litigation. In this way, presumed immateriality moves corporate law
towards a regime that embraces the idea of public solutions for market failures, instead of
solutions anchored in the private sector. It supports (in a way) an expanded regime of
government power and regulation, and reduced enforcement through private parties.
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And so what? This question deserves further thought and study. But it seems to
me that if we are to take seriously the idea of privileging investor rationality, then it is
just as easy to picture a regime where we affirmatively punish investors that exhibit
especially egregious "irrational" behaviors. (Such as prohibiting day traders from buying
or selling stock.) If such proposals are too draconian for our tastes, why do we accept
presumed immateriality which creates substantially similar economic effects?
Once we realize that the duty to be rational is an ideological choice based on
courts’ model of corporate governance, we should also question if this model is a good fit
for the special purposes and goals of securities law. That is, is the duty to be rational a
natural outgrowth of the 1933 or 1934 securities acts, which seek to protect functioning
(and presumably efficient) markets? Perhaps so, but it is hard to square reduced civil
enforcement with an evolving congressional policy to increase access by individual
investors to the capital markets.
These questions about the nature of the duty, and the source of the right, suggest
only some of the difficulties posed by courts’ creation of new shareholder obligations.
That courts are so willing to dismiss so many claims based on an failure to behave
rationally is troubling; that courts have not made the duty clear is worse.
V.

Conclusion

The materiality standard’s development as a proxy for economic rationality
parallels related movements in areas of the law less commonly associated with wealth
creation. The issue in some parts of private law adjudication (particularly, in commonlaw torts) iswheth er to allow juries to substitute their ideas of reasonableness and
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retribution for what scholars believe should determine reasonableness, i.e., efficiency.280
In evaluating procedural reforms, some argue we should transfer the jury's role to
bureaucrats, able to rationally assess societal risks and benefits.281
Inevitably, such paternalistic solutions appear an attractive remedy to the
malleability and incoherence of human decisionmaking. Indeed, as observed earlier in
this paper, many have suggested that BLE appears to foster proposals which remove
power from citizens, to delegitimate decisions which are not related to rational ends.
BLE appears to be evolving into a technocratic legal discipline.
The doctrine of presumed immateriality provides an opportunity to reflect on this
trend. Courts, ignoring BLE insights, are nonetheless doing precisely what some BLE
scholars would have them do: deferring reflexively to the government (when it sues), and
thus empowering government regulators. At the same time, by shifting from a legal
regime that focuses on the specific facts of each corporation’s financial state to the mere
language contained in the disclosure, courts help wealthy defendants at the expense of
"less rational," and often poorer plaintiffs. And, as I have explored, the duty to be a
rational shareholder may create demographic and redistributive effects that courts have
not contemplated. Finally, presumed immateriality appears to permit corporations to
intentionally make disclosures they hope and expect will engender detrimental reliance
while avoiding the consequences the securities laws intended to impose. Thus, current
doctrine should satisfy no one.
And, there is a possibility that presumed immateriality will have increased
consequences in the near future. Recent proposals would "privatize" social security by
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creating individual retirement accounts.282 Under proposals that truly create individual
accounts, presumed immateriality might, because it undermines securities insurance for
irrational investors (that is, most of us, most of the time), endanger the retirement funds
of millions of Americans.283
What, then, to do? Some have argued that courts ought to equate materiality with
market effects: when stock prices react to disclosures, we should presume that the
disclosure was material to a reasonable investor.284 Such proposals would make it
substantially more difficult for courts to impose any given ideology.285 It might also
create proper incentives for corporations to present information in as clear a way as
possible. However, the market-materiality proposal appears to assume that Congress
intended the securities laws to be a form of insurance, as I have proposed, and not a
mechanism to protect the market itself, as many believe.286 Market-materiality,
moreover, could result in politically controversial suits proceeding further in litigation
than current doctrine permits. In short, if this is the solution to the problems this article
has uncovered, it may be a utopian one.
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Fixing the doctrine is only a small part in the larger story, which relates to how
courts ought to rethink their traditional approaches to the construct of the "reasonable
person." In the past, courts used three basic methods to evaluate reasonableness: (1)
divine a standard from first principles or previously existing operative law; (2) leave the
decision of reasonableness to a jury; or (3) intuit reasonableness using the judge’s own
experience a guide. This problem arose in many different areas of law, from traditional
first-year subjects like contracts, torts and criminal law, 287 to regulatory topics like false
advertising and employment discrimination. This paper has shown that – at least in the
securities context – courts have used reasonableness as a proxy for a normative, behavior
shaping, rationality standard. Empirical analysis of courts' treatment of reasonableness in
other areas of law might result insimilarly interesting results.
Whether certain behaviors are or are not ordinary and reasonable need not be
resolved by informed judicial hunches. Courts have a fourth option: useof experimental
evidence of human behavior to help guide the relevant decision makers to a better
understanding of how individuals actually act. This option is to be preferred.
Application of BLE should lead courts to a significantly more cautious approach toward
presumed immateriality, or, at the very least, to more transparency about their ideological
goals and the relationship between those goals and the purposes of the securities laws.
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